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Abstract
Many developing economies are characterized by the dominance of a super
metropolis. Taking historical Rome as the archetype of a city that centralizes
political power to extract resources from the rest of the country, we develop two
models of rent-seeking and expropriation which illustrate di¤erent mechanisms
that relate political competition to economic outcomes. The "voice" model shows
that rent-seeking by di¤erent interest groups (localized in di¤erent specialized
cities/regions) will lead to low investment and growth when the number of such
groups is small. The "exit" model allows political competition among those with
political power (to tax or expropriate from citizens) over a footloose tax base.
It shows that when this power is centralized in relatively few urban nodes, tax
rates would be higher and growth rates lower. Our empirical work exploits the
connection between urban wealth (with the political power it a¤ords) and national
soccer championships. By using a cross-country data set for 103 countries for the
period 1960-99, we nd strong and robust evidence that countries with higher
concentrations in urban wealthas proxied by the number of di¤erent cities with
championships in national soccer leaguestend to have lower long-run growth rates.
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1 Introduction
At its zenith around the second century A.D., Rome had become by far the largest city
in the world with a population well in excess of 800,000. Roman law had, quite early on
(123 B.C.), entitled each citizen to receive a certain quantity of wheat at a xed price. By
58 B.C. a succession of amendments to the law had reduced this price to zero. By 45 B.C.
no fewer than 320,000 Romans received a free daily ration of bread that varied from 1 to
1.5 kilograms (yielding calories that would exceed the daily needs of an average adult).1
Though, it has been estimated that by this time between 30 to 40 percent of the residents
of Rome were either unemployed or underemployed, [t]he state distribution of bread
never bore, and would never bear, the least resemblance to assistance. Nothing indicates
that the poorest citizens were given preference;...everything points to the reverse.2 Rome
used its military and political might to suppress potential competitors to its rule and to
extract resources from its empire. The result was that the parasitic character of the
Roman metropolis was not only responsible for a weakening of the Italian economy; it
also played a central part in...the collapse of the empire.3
The parallels between the remarkably extreme concentration of urban population and
political power in the Roman Empire, and similar patterns observed in the developing
countries of the modern world have led Bairoch (1988) to label such modern cities
Romes without empires.
Such concentrations were a long time in the making. Around 1930, when developing
market economies had an average level of urbanization of 12.6%, 16% of their urban
population lived in fourteen large cities (cities that had populations of more than half a
million). Such a high concentration of urban population in large cities of the developed
world had been attained in 1880, when its average level of urbanization stood much
higher at 23%. The number of large cities in the developing world as well as their share
of the total urban population increased radically between 1930 and 1980, by which
date they had 43% of the urban population, a number which paralleled that of the
developed countries. However, the level of urbanization in the latter stood at 65%
whereas developing market economies had an urbanization level half of that.4
High levels of urban concentration in the developing world typically had their origins
when a few cities started out as major outlets for the export of products from their
1See Bairoch (1988, p. 81).
2Veyne (1976) cited in ibid. p.84.
3 ibid. p. 105.
4For these numbers, see Bairoch (1988).
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hinterlands and became centers of colonial or post-colonial administration, beneting
from a lack of e¤ective competition from provincial centers.5 Thus, in colonial Span-
ish America a tiny number of ports (one in Spain and three in America) monopolized
trade and prevented the formation of a dense commercial network, impeding the gen-
esis of a system of specialization and exchange across the colonies. In contrast, British
North America developed hundreds of ports and surrounding hinterland economies, let-
ting them compete against each other.6 This contrast is symptomatic of the structural
di¤erences that led the two regions along divergent political and economic paths. North
et al. (2000) argue that centralization of political power that results in an authoritarian
establishment of order typically leads governments to transgress the rights of the cit-
izens. The lack of well-dened rights implies that more resources have to be devoted by
agents to protect themselves from the state reducing the amount of resources allocated
to productive activities. By decreasing the threat of unilateral expropriation of property,
a more polycentric distribution of political power, on the other hand, would lead to more
secure property rights and a larger share of resources allocated to productive activities.
The connections between the security of property rights, the distribution of political
power and cities have long been recognized. In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith
emphasized the importance of the liberty and security of individuals,noting that it
was because of this security in the cities that industry ourished and stock accumu-
latedthere before the country. Smith argued that cities in France and England were
given their freedom as a consequence of the political competition between the sovereign
and feudal lords. As he put it [t]he burghers naturally hated and feared the lords.
The king hated and feared them too; but though perhaps he might despise, he had no
reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest, therefore, disposed them
to support the king, and the king to support them against the lords. They were the
enemies of his enemies, and it was his interest to render them as secure and independent
of those enemies as he could (Smith 2000, p. 430). It was also the direct pressure
put on princes by alliances of cities such as the Hanseatic League, Greif et al. (1994)
argue, that led to more secure property rights and, therefore, to the medieval expansion
of trade. A related argument is put forward by Weingast (1995), who points to the
role played by decentralization (federalism) in the economic development and growth
of Netherlands from the late 16th through mid-17th century, England from the late
17th or early 18th through the mid-19th century, and the United States from the late
5Clark (1996) and Balchin et al. (2000).
6North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000).
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19th century until the late 20th century.An important reason why the industrial re-
volution could make headway in England was that when regulations in the established
urban centers threatened to choke o¤ the edgling industrial activity, local justices in
the north, who had their own political authority and, thus, regulatory power, competed
to attract new forms of economic activity to their jurisdictions. This pattern, which
would have been impossible in an economy where all scal and regulatory power had
been centralized, was eventually repeated elsewhere in Europe which saw the rise of a
large number of new towns and cities that came to represent the new industrial interests
as opposed to the established centers7. In Asia it was in the second half of the nineteenth
century that a number of port cities of the agrarian empires were able to break free of
the centralized authorities. International agreements imposed upon these authorities by
the colonial powers established judicial systems that dramatically improved security of
property rights and led to an unprecedented economic expansion.8 In the same vein, the
recent economic renaissance of China followed the establishment of a decentralized scal
system. Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) argue that it is this decentralization
that ensured the success of the Chinese reforms of 1979-1993. By establishing altern-
ative centers of power, argue Montinola et al., decentralization generated forces that
successfully resisted later attempts by the central government to compromise the re-
forms and led to the continuation of Chinas spectacular growth. Explaining the policies
followed by states in tropical Africa after independence, Bates (1981) emphasizes that
the widespread adoption of policies that transferred resources from agriculture to infant
industries was a consequence of the lack of political power of geographically dispersed
agricultural interests. Urban groups, on the other hand, were able to wield their political
power much more e¤ectively by virtue of their geographical concentration. As we argue
below in the case studies section, this line of reasoning helps explain the di¤erences in
economic performance of many countries outside Africa as well.
The connection between urban concentration and the level of economic development
has been the subject of a large literature, starting with the seminal paper of Williamson
(1965) which put forward the hypothesis that one should expect a non-monotonic rela-
tion between the two. At early stages of development, Williamson supposed high urban
concentration to be helpful by conserving expenditure on infrastructure and by enhan-
cing information spillovers at a point when the economy su¤ers from a severe scarcity
7See Bairoch (1988). De Vries (1984) shows that during early industrialization in Europe the slope
of the rank-size distributions became atter, indicating a movement towards polycentrism.
8See Basu (1985), Broeze (1989), and Keyder et al. (1993).
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of infrastructure and information.9 With the development of the economy, it becomes
possible to spread the infrastructure and information into the hinterland, while rising
costs in congested urban areas push producers and consumers out of these erstwhile
centers. This pattern of income growth, resulting initially in higher and later in lower
urban concentration, is supported by a number of empirical studies (El-Shaks 1972;
Alonso 1980; Rosen and Resnick 1980; Wheaton and Shishido 1981; Mutlu 1989; Ades
and Glaeser 1995; Junius 1999; Davis and Henderson 2003; and Moomaw and Alwosabi
2004). A more recent strand of literature focuses on political factors to explain high
urban concentration (Henderson 1988; Ades and Glaeser 1995; Henderson and Becker
2000; Davis and Henderson 2003). Here the mechanism emphasized is that of a national
government favoring a capital or central city in terms of investment, granting of loans,
licences, etc. at the expense of the hinterland. This, it is argued, allows the bureaucrats
in the center to compete more e¤ectively in the extraction of rents against low-ranking
rivals in the provinces.
The question, however, of the implications of high urban concentration for economic
outcomes remains largely unexamined. The glaring exception is the recent paper by
Henderson (2003) that formulates the question as the so whatof urban concentration
and studies the quantitative e¤ects of both urbanization and urban concentration on
productivity growth. Henderson nds evidence that there is a level of urban concentra-
tion that maximizes productivity growth and that this level depends on the development
and the size of the economy.10
Our paper di¤ers from the existing literature in the area in a number of respects.
First, unlike others, it focuses on the political economy mechanisms that causally link
urban concentration to economic growth. The argument we advance formally is that
urban concentration, by e¤ectively centralizing political and economic power11 at the
expense of potential competitors that could have arisen elsewhere, has deleterious e¤ects
on the rate of growth of the economy in question. Several political economy mechanisms
may account for the suggested negative e¤ects of centralization. Our paper formalizes
two of these which could be called the voice and exitmechanisms. The rst one
9Davis and Henderson (2003) compiles these microfoundations from various sources: labor market
matching, outsourcing and local intra-industry specialization and local diversity in non-traded interme-
diate goods.
10Gallup et al. (1999) imply that urbanization may promote growth. Henderson (2003) nds no
evidence for this hypothesis.
11On the connection between wealth and political power, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005).
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supposes that, with division of labor and specialization, di¤erent urban centers become
nodes of di¤erent and potentially competing interests.12 To the extent that the political
institutions allow for, and respond to, active rent-seeking by these interests, agents will
not restrict themselves to purely economic activities, but engage in rent-seeking and
try to redistribute income to themselves through political channels. The voicemodel
(a version of the celebrated Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobbying setup) that form-
alizes such activity, shows that as long as political competition remains limited, those
organized groups that expend resources in rent-seeking succeed in redistributing income
to themselves. However, a rise in the number of interests that engage in such political
competition, reduces and eventually eliminates such redistribution. Insofar as redistri-
bution leads to deadweight losses, its elimination would have benecial consequences for
economic development. The second mechanism is formalized in an exitmodel which
starts with the argument that competition among rulers of political centers with some
ability to conduct independent economic policy (such as cities that are administrative
centers of regions within a country) might promote economic growth.13 An environment
that could give rise to such an outcome is one where footloose agents nd it possible to
move to those jurisdictions/cities where rulers o¤er policies that are more conducive to
the economic welfare of these agents. The exitmodel indeed shows that centralization
of power leads to higher expropriation rates and lower levels of public services, whereas
political competition for mobile resourcesimproves outcomes signicantly, leading to
higher long-run growth rates.
The role of political competition in promoting the adoption of more e¢ cient policies,
in general, has been noted in di¤erent contexts. Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
Mitra (1999), for instance, show that the higher the number of lobbies involved the
smaller the tari¤ subsidies awarded.14 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) point
out that concentration of political power in the hands of an elite implies that the majority
12Henderson (1988) and Lee (1997) nd that for Brazil, US, Korea, and India cities are relatively
specialized. Using 1990 data for the US, Black and Henderson (2003) show that production patterns
across di¤erent city types are statistically di¤erent and that specialization, especially among smaller
cities, tends to be absolute. Kim (1995) examines how patterns of specialization in the US have
changed over time. He nds that states are substantially less specialized in 1987 than in 1860, but that
localization, or concentration has increased over time. For Korea, Henderson, Lee, and Lee (2001) nd
that from 1983 to 1993, city specialization, as measured by a normalized Hirschman-Herndahl index,
rises in manufacturing, while a provincial level index declines.
13Karayalcin (2008) uses this setup in comparing the historical records of the agrarian empires of the
East with that of the European states system.
14See also Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 7).
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of the population risks being held up by the elite after they undertake investments. This
lack of secure property rights would then discourage investment and economic growth.
Weingast (1995) argues that the crucial factor that generated economic expansion in both
cases was political competition among jurisdictions (which he labels market-preserving
federalism) for the mobile capital and labor because this competition limited the ability
of the state to conscate wealth.15 Epple and Romer (1991) present a static closed-
economy model where exit, that is the mobility of factors (a la Tiebout, 1956) subject
to taxation, limits the extent of redistribution. Optimal taxation when the tax base
is mobile internationally has been studied extensively in the literature (see Persson
and Tabellini 1995 for a survey.) Recent common property models of growth (see, for
example, Benhabib and Rustichini 1996; Lane and Tornell 1996) focus on the negative
e¤ects of conict among social groups on growth as they attempt to expropriate resources
from each other. In Grossman and Kim (1996) agents adopt a voicestrategy, namely,
arming themselves to the teeth against potential predators/expropriators.16 Another
historically important alternative strategy is insurrection or revolt that, if successful,
results in the overthrow of the rulers by their subjects (see Grossman 1991). Thus,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue cogently that the extension of the franchise in the
West was a response to the threat of revolution. Democracy was necessary because the
only safeguard for the sustained redistribution desired by the masses was possession of
political power. This link between political power and the redistribution of wealth it
a¤ords those who happen to command such power has been used in a number of di¤erent
contexts. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) exploit this link to argue that political elites
may block technological and institutional developments for fear that they would lead to
loss of political power, which would then translate into an economic loss. Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), among others, point out that in majoritarian democracies, which give
the median voter the decisive political power, this power could be used to redistribute
wealth. To the extent that such redistribution has to be carried out by distortionary
taxation, this would lower the rate of growth of the economy.
The other major area where we di¤er from the existing literature is in the empirical
15Weingast (1995) Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) also point out the fundamental role played
by federalism in the remarkable growth performance of China over the past two decades. North,
Summerhill, and Weingast (2000), and Nugent and Robinson (2001) emphasize the importance of
political competition for the growth performance of a number of Latin American countries.
16In their empirical investigation of the importance of institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)
nd that institutions which protect citizens against expropriation have a rst order e¤ect on long-run
economic growth.
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section of the paper. This section takes the central hypothesis of the theoretical part
of the paper, namely, that higher urban concentration reects the centralization of eco-
nomic wealth and political power and would, ceteris paribus, lower the rate of income
growth. In the existing literature data considerations have forced researchers to adopt
one of the three following measures of urban concentration. The rst measure used
is the standard Hirschman-Herndahl index applied to an urban context using urban
population data (see Wheaton and Shishido 1981; and Henderson 1988). A second one
(as in Rosen and Resnick 1980) is the Pareto parameter which measures how city sizes
decline as we move downward along the relevant distribution. Both measures adopted
in these papers are limited to just one year and cover only a restricted sample of mostly
larger countries in the world. As they are not available for a larger group of countries for
a longer period of time Henderson (2003) uses a third measure, namely urban primacy,
which focuses on the share of the largest metropolitan area in the urban population. If
this share is higher than 25%, urban primacy correlates highly with the previous two
measures. In the data set used in Henderson (2003), the average primacy level turns
out to be 0.31, and the measure used correlates well with the the previous two metrics.
However, in the larger data set that we use, the average urban primacy level is only
0.14, with the consequence that the urban primacy measure fails to be a good proxy in
our context.
Furthermore, the theoretical arguments we formulate are predicated on the use of
a ner measure of urban concentration closely linked to the geographic dispersion of
political power, and of wealth, within the country. So, the size of the metropolitan
population typically used in the urban concentration literature, does not necessarily
provide a ne metric of the distribution of resources or of wealth among cities and,
thus, need not correlate well with the political power they wield in the national political
arena. These considerations lead us to adopt an alternative measure: an index of the
distribution of soccer championships across cities in a given economy, mimicking the
geographic concentration of political inuence and wealth. This index captures jointly
the e¤ects of voice and exit models. The economics of sports literature suggests that,
as the worlds most popular sport (as measured by spectators and the number of people
playing), soccer produces successful teams largely in those urban centers that have re-
latively high economic potential. The traditional soccer team nancing strategy, the
so-called Spectators-Subsidies-Sponsors-Local (SSSL) model, remains by far the dom-
inant one despite attempts by teams to switch to what is called a Media-Magnates-
Merchandising-Markets-Global (MMMMG) structure. As recent empirical work (see,
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inter alia, Frick and Prinz 2004) shows, there is a high correlation between success and
the availability of local resources.17 We exploit this fact and construct a Herndahl
index of the distribution of soccer championships across cities to proxy the geographical
concentration of political power. Our exitmodel predicts that when political power is
dispersed over jurisdictions (with their centers represented typically by cities), political
competition among them for footloose productive agents that form their tax bases would
lead to the adoption of more pro-growth policies.18 Similarly, our voicemodel predicts
that the more dispersed political power is across cities representing conicting special
interests, the stronger would be the political competition among them, resulting again
in less distortionary, more pro-growth policies.19
It turns out that empirically the soccer data capture the mechanisms formalized re-
markably well. Utilizing a cross-sectional data of 103 countries covering the 1960-1999
period, an instrumental variables estimation followed by a number of sensitivity checks
nds strong and robust empirical support for the hypothesis that a lower degree of urban
concentration is highly positively correlated with long-run development. In our instru-
mentation strategy, we use binary indicators of primate capital city and federalization,
as well as a group of variables put forward by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) that refer to the historical
origins of institutional quality within countries, namely, log settler mortality, urbaniza-
tion and log population density in 1500s, constraint on the executive at independence,
and independence year. First-stage regressions indicate signicant associations between
the instrumental variables and the distribution of soccer championships in predicted dir-
ections, enabling us to capture both contemporary and historical e¤ects regarding the
politics of geographical concentration in the second stage. Regressions with growth rate
of real GDP per capita, the latter being an alternative to the benchmark development
measure log per capita income, suggest that countries with the highest and the lowest
concentration scores in our sample - Paraguay and Germany, respectively, are typical
representatives - display a di¤erence of about 2% in their average annual growth rates
over the period 1960-1999 due to economic and political centralization and its associ-
17See also Dobson and Goddard (2001).
18A typical example from the US would be the recent two-year competition of towns in more than
25 states to attract Toyota. In February 2007, Toyota announced that Tupelo, Mississippi beat its two
closest rivals from Arkansas and Tennessee and would be the site of a new assembly plant.
19When, for example, US steel producers successfully lobbied for the imposition of a tari¤ on imported
steel (which took e¤ect on March 20, 2002), counter-lobbying by US automakers (as well as a ruling by
the WTO) was instrumental for the lifting of the tari¤ on December 4, 2003.
8
ated e¤ects. Given the enormous importance of such di¤erences in growth rates for
per capita GDP in the long run, it is hard to overstate their signicance. In terms of
robustness checks, among others, we draw insights from a panel dataset, explore the
association across decennary cross-sections, and check the sensitivity of the results to
the measurement of the soccer information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the models of
voiceand exitas versions of political competition. Section 4 discusses our empirical
methodology and Section 5 the empirical ndings. Section 6 presents the sensitivity
analysis. We provide a number of short case studies in Section 7 while Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2 Voice: Rent-seeking/Lobbying
The voice model presented here captures in a simple way the mechanism whereby limited
political competition among self-interested parties would lead to distortions and dead-
weight losses. Increased political competition, on the other hand, would lead to more
secure property rights (in the sense of reduced expropriation/taxation from unorganized
groups) and more investment. To the extent that one identies di¤erent interests as
being locally di¤erentiatedas would be the case, for instance, in an economy where
division of labor and specialization has advancedthis would imply that those countries
that are more polycentric would have higher growth rates.
Consider now an economy populated by two types of agents: a ruler (government)
and a large number of citizens whose mass is normalized to one. All agents live for two
periods. There are N groups of citizens in the economy, each representing a special in-
terest localized in di¤erent cities/regions. Each group has mass i with
P
i = 1. Some
of the groups are organized into interest groups, others remain unorganized. Without
loss of generality let  = f1; ::; ng and  = fn + 1; ::; Ng be the sets of organized and
unorganized groups. Each citizen in group i maximizes lifetime utility Ui given by
Ui = u(c1i) + u(c2i); (1)
subject to
c1i = (1   i)ei   si; c2i = Rsi (2)
where cki is consumption in period-k (kf1; 2g)of an agent in group i, R is the gross rate
of return, e and s denote endowment income and savings. The only policy instruments
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available to the ruler are proportional tax/subsidy rates, the vector of which is denoted
by  = ( 1; :::; N) where  i > 0 ( i < 0) denotes a tax (subsidy) rate. Solution of a
citizens problem given in (1) and (2) yields the indirect utility
Vi = V ( i); V
0(:) < 0: (3)
Suppose, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), that the rulers utility function UR()
takes the form
UR() =
X
j
Cj() + a
() (4)
where Cj() is the contribution schedule of interest group j, 
 =
PN
i=1 iVi is aggregate
social welfare, and a is the weight the ruler attaches to social welfare 
. If a = 0, the
ruler cares only about the contributions he receives, while if a ! 1 he behaves as a
utilitarian social planner.
Suppose that the tax-cum-subsidy policy is purely redistributionary
X
i iei   T = 0 (5)
where T is the deadweight loss from taxation.
Rent-seeking by organized lobbies takes the following form: all groups organized into
lobbies o¤er truthful contribution schedules
Cj() = max[0; j(Vj()  !j)] (6)
(where the scalars !i are to be determined in equilibrium) that reveal how much they
are willing to pay for the implementation of the policy vector  . The ruler chooses 
after observing the o¤ered contributions.
Focusing, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), on equilibria where organized groups
make positive contributions, (4) and (5) yield
maxUR() =
X
j
j(Vj()  !j) + a
()) max
X
j
jVj() + a
(): (7)
Thus,
 = argmax

 X
j
jVj() + a
X
i[
iVi()
!
; (8)
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that, is the policy vector chosen by the ruler is the one that maximizes a weighted social
welfare function where the welfare of organized groups receives the weight 1+a, whereas
that of the unorganized groups receives a weight of only a. In other words, rent-seekers
(groups that engage in lobbying here) obtain favorable treatment from the ruler in return
for the resources transferred to him. Note also that (6) is a special form of the more
general political support function of Hillman (1989) and provides micro foundations for
this function.
To put the results into sharp focus, specialize now the period utility functions u(cki)
to u(cki) = ln cki, and let the deadweight loss be proportional to total (and given
P
i
i = 1, average) income e =
P
i[ iei, so that
T =
(
e > 0 if 9i such that  i > 0;
0 if 8i  i = 0:
(9)
(7) then yields the following expressions for the tax/subsidy rates for organized and
unorganized groups
 j = 1  e
ej
(1 + a)(1  )
(o + a)
; j (10)
 i = 1  e
ei
a(1  )
(o + a)
; i (11)
where o[0; 1] denotes the mass of individuals organized in interest groups. These
equations yield a number of results, the most important of which for our purposes are
summarized by the following.
Proposition 1 Let, for simplicity, all individuals have the same endowment income so
that ei = e for all i [ . Then organized groups receive a subsidy and unorganized
groups are taxed as long as the mass of individuals belonging to rent-seeking groups is
less than a critical level ~o = 1 (1+a). Once the critical level is reached redistribution
ends.
Proof. This follows immediately from (8)-(11).
The proposition reects the argument that interest groups typically engage in rent-
seeking activities, attempting to redistribute income from the rest of the population
to themselves. Such activity succeeds as long as it does not meet with e¤ective op-
position from groups that are adversely e¤ected. Here, up to a point, contributions to
the government buy organized groups a more favorable treatment from the government
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(which assigns them a higher weight, 1 + a, in the social welfare function) as compared
to non-organized groups (which are assigned a lower weight). However, when resistance
to predatory practices becomes more intense, that is, when more individuals are organ-
ized in groups with conicting interests, political competition among them eventually
eliminates such practices.
Proposition 2 Redistribution depresses aggregate investment and, thus, growth until
political competition among interest groups reaches a critical level (expressed by the crit-
ical mass of organized groups in Proposition 1). Beyond that critical level investment
and growth bounces to a higher level.
Proof. First note that (1) and (2) yield si = [=(1 + )](1    i)ei. Thus, total
savings s is given by s = [=(1 + )]
P
i[(1   i)iei. Substituting the rulers budget
constraint yields s = [=(1 + )](e   T ). Once political competition among groups (as
measured by the mass o of citizens engaged in organized rent-seeking activity) reaches
the critical level ~o , the ruler stops redistributing income through taxes and subsidies,
deadweight losses vanish and savings, investment, and, thus, growth rise to a higher
level.
Thus, we have established that once it attains a certain critical level, increased
political competition among interest groups leads to reduced taxation (expropriation),
improving the security of property and, thus, leading to more investment and higher
levels of growth.
3 Exit: Long-run growth under centralized and de-
centralized systems
We now turn to an analysis of long-run growth under centralized and decentralized
systems. To do so we use a simple dynamic setup to illustrate the main points. An
economy in this setup consists of two types of agents, rulers and citizens. Citizens
produce a good that can be used for consumption and investment. Rulers appropriate a
portion of the good produced and, in return, may choose to supply public services that
enhance the productivity of the citizens. Rulers are identied with di¤erent cities/regions
which we will label jurisdictions. We start by discussing the role and nature of these
public services.
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3.1 Productive Public Services
Each citizen i in jurisdiction j has access to a production technology summarized by
yji = k
j
i f(G
j=Y j); f(0) = 0; f 0 > 0; f 00 < 0; where yji is the quantity of the composite
good produced by the citizen i,  is a positive constant, kji is the stock of capitalthat
the citizen has in his possession, f is a function that depends on the total output of
the jurisdiction Y j =
R
yji di, and G
j  0 denotes the amount of public good provided
by the ruler of jurisdiction j. The formulation of the function f() reects three con-
siderations: (i) the higher the level of public services provided, the more productive
each producer is; (ii) the provision of public services is essential for social orderand
for production so that if the ruler fails to provide such services no production can take
place (f(0) = 0); and (iii) typically, the provision of public services such as security,
adjudication, and infrastructure is subject to congestion, i.e., the public service is rival
but not excludable.20
We now turn to the description of the problem faced by the citizens.
3.2 The citizens
Citizens are innitely-lived dynastic families. Each family i residing in jurisdiction j
chooses its consumption cji to maximize its lifetime welfare U
j
i =
R1
0
u(cji;t)e
 tdt (with
u(ci;t) =
(cji;t)
1  1
1  ) subject to the budget constraint
21 cji +
_kji = (1    j)yji ; where  j is
the constant rate at which the ruler expropriates income. Henceforth, for simplicity, we
shall call  j the tax rate with the understanding that this need not coincide with the
legal tax rate (legitimized by whatever political mechanism that may exist).
A jurisdiction j starts life with a continuum of citizens whose mass is N j. The
citizens may move from one jurisdiction to another, taking their capital with them, if
doing so improves their welfare. Citizens who move incur a one-time migration cost
  0.
3.3 The rulers
Each jurisdiction is ruled by one innitely-lived ruler. Rulers derive utility from con-
sumption. They also derive an additional benet from ruling a jurisdiction with a
20Note that G is a ow, so that the right interpretation say, for roads, would be total mileage per
year, etc.
21In what follows we drop the time subscripts except where there is risk of confusion.
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minimum number, N > 0, of inhabitants. We suppose that this is the minimum num-
ber required, inter alia, to sustain, for instance, the jurisdiction and its ruler as in-
dependent entities. Formally, rulers maximize U jr =
R1
0
u(cjr;t)e
 tdt + 
(N j) (with

(N j) =  > 0 if N j  N > 0 and 
(N j) = 0 if N j < N), where the subscript r
indicates a ruler and the function 
(N j) captures the additional benets a ruler enjoys
when the jurisdiction has at least N citizens.22
From citizens residing and producing in jurisdiction j its ruler collects tax revenues,
 jY j of which he uses a fraction (1  j) to nance the provision of public goods; thus,
Gj = (1 j) jY j. The rest is employed for the rulers consumption; thus cj = j jY j.
We now turn to the description of equilibrium, rst in a centralized economy and,
secondly, in a decentralized system of multiple jurisdictions forming an economy .
3.4 The centralized economy
A centralized economy for our purposes is an economy from which its inhabitants nd
it impossible to emigrate. Formally, a centralized economy is an economy where the
migration cost  !1. Thus, the ruler of such a centralized economy nds himself with
a subject population on which taxes can be imposed without fear of losing at least some
of them to a rival ruler. The problem that confronts such a ruler is to determine (1) the
level of the proportional tax to be imposed upon his citizens, and (2) the fraction of the
tax revenue that can be used to nance the rulers consumption. An increase in the tax
rate has two contradictory consequences. On the one hand, it reduces the rate of return
on investment and, thus, lowers the rate of capital accumulation by his citizens. This
depresses future output and future revenues that can be appropriated by the ruler. On
the other hand, given the existing capital stock, a higher tax rate yields, ceteris paribus,
more tax revenue, enabling the ruler to supply a higher quantity of the public good.
This, in turn, increases both the output and the rate of return on investment.
Formally, to solve the problem confronting the ruler of the centralized economy, we
start by describing the behavior of the citizens facing given  and  (thus, a given
quantity of the public good relative to total output).23 Citizens maximize their utility
subject to their budget constraint, facing an after-tax rate of return on capital equal
22The only role this additional benet plays in the analysis that follows is to ensure that a ruler that
chooses the optimal tax and appropriation rates is never indi¤erent between that choice and that of
adopting policies that lead to the loss of all citizens.
23In this section we drop the economy superscripts j because we are concerned with a single centralized
economy.
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to (1   )f(G=Y ). It is straightforward to show that given constant  and , the
choices of the citizens yield growth rates for consumption, capital, and output all equal
to the same constant g = (1=) f(1  )f [(1  ) ]  g. Given our restrictions on the
function f(), this growth rate initially rises with the tax rate  at low values and falls
with it as  keeps rising. The value of  that maximizes the growth rate g is implicitly
given by (1  )(1  )f 0[(1  ) ] = f [(1  ) ]. It is straightforward to show that the
welfare of an individual citizen depends positively on the growth rate g.
Turning now to the problem faced by the ruler, we rst observe that since his con-
sumption is given by c = Y it also grows at the common constant rate g given
time-invariant choices for  and . The rst-order conditions of the rulers problem can
be shown to yield the following results.24 First, the optimal tax rate for the ruler of the
centralized economy is not the one that maximizes the growth rate. Since a citizens life-
time welfare depends positively on the growth rate, this choice is then suboptimal for a
given citizen. Second, given the relationship between the growth and tax rates discussed
above, it is easy to see that the tax rate is higher than the one that would be chosen
by a benevolent ruler that seeks to maximize the welfare of the citizens. However, the
ruler follows the familiar condition for e¢ ciency and chooses the level of G such that the
marginal benet, dY=dG, of public services provided equals its marginal cost in terms
of output foregone.
We now turn to the discussion of equilibrium in the case of a decentralized economy.
3.5 The decentralized economy
Consider now an environment where citizens and rulers nd themselves distributed over
a number of jurisdictions j (j 2 f1; 2; ::;Mg). Initially, each jurisdiction has N j  N
inhabitants and a ruler. Suppose that the cost of migration is low enough to allow
movement of citizens across the jurisdictions; for simplicity, assume that this cost  = 0.
Citizens that can move around within this decentralized economy will choose to
reside in the jurisdiction that o¤ers them the highest level of lifetime welfare. Rulers
will, therefore, have to compete to attract tax-paying citizens to ensure the continuing
existence of a tax base and the viability of their jurisdictions and rule. What will be the
equilibrium outcome of the interaction of the M rulers and their citizens?
Given our bare-bones setup, the answer is straightforward and captures the essence
of the centralized vs. decentralized economy argument. The Nash equilibrium of the
24See Karayalcin (2008).
15
game played among rulers is that each ruler will choose  = (m; m) which ensures
the maximum growth rate. To see why, recall that the lifetime welfare of a citizen is
maximized when the growth rate is at its maximum (see (17)). If other rulers do not
adopt the combination , the ruler who does will be able to attract citizens of others to
his jurisdiction, thereby receiving a payo¤ higher than he would otherwise get. If other
rulers adopt , a ruler who does not, loses all his citizens and earns a payo¤ that is less
than what he would earn had he adopted . Note also that the growth-rate-maximizing
tax rate is implicitly given by (1   m)f 0(m) = f(m) and that competition among
rulers results in m = 0.
4 Empirical analysis
The models above provide testable implications. In this section, we conduct a cross-
country empirical analysis to test the impact of geographical concentration of wealth
on economic development. To proxy the geographical concentration of wealth, we use
a Herndahl measure on soccer championships in the rst division leagues around the
world. Concentration of political power in a small number of urban centers and the
consequent lack of political competition would imply that soccer champion clubs would
consistently originate from only a few cities. On the other hand, if urban wealth, hence
the political power, is spread across the country, champion clubs would be located in
a number of di¤erent cities. Thus, two central tools of the theoretical models, i.e.,
political competition and decentralization are well-captured by this variable. Our data
set covers a cross-section of 103 countries observed over the 1960-1999 period. We
analyze a number of dimensions of the data including using growth rates instead of
levels of income, di¤erent samples, and di¤erent sets of instrumental variables.
4.1 Soccer Championship Data and Sample Selection
Soccer (or football) is the most popular sport in the world as measured both by the
number of people attending soccer games25 and the number of viewers (counted in bil-
lions) who watch the game on TV.26 Furthermore, soccer is played at professional leagues
across the globe while hundreds of thousands play the game as amateurs. A survey con-
25See Baseball or Football: which sport gets the higher attendance? Guardian Unlimited, 5 June
2006.
26See 2002 FIFA World Cup TV Coverage,FIFA o¢ cial website, May 13, 2006
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ducted by FIFA and published in the Spring of 2001 found that over 240 million people
regularly play soccer in more than 200 countries.27
What makes soccer especially attractive for our purposes is the fact that in profes-
sional premier leagues teams competing for the championships have traditionally been
associated with urban centers, each city worth its salt being represented by at least one
soccer team in the league. Successful teams in these leagues are the ones that can hire
the best talent, a feat which requires command over relatively large resources that need
to be raised from fans, supporters, merchandise sales and broadcast revenues. Typically
most of these sources are local. Even when there is revenue sharing among teams in the
league, studies have found that this does not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the
survival probabilities of the teams. Thus, a recent study of several European leagues,
where broadcast revenue sharing is more signicant than in other countries, concludes
that ...as long as teams are located in cities of widely varying revenue potentials, cross-
subsidization of weak-drawing teams neither provides prot incentives for team owners
nor does it promote the survival of weak-drawing clubs.28 It, therefore, appears to be
safe to conclude that teams that credibly contest championships are the ones located in
cities which command relatively more resources. One could then use the correspondence
between soccer champions and the relative economic importance of the cities which these
teams represent to tease out the geographical distribution and concentration of wealth
within a given country.
Soccer championship statistics on www.rsssf.com29 show that around 170 (adult-
male) rst division leagues have been played in the world in the 1960-1999 period.
To understand how soccer relates to geographical distribution of wealth, consider the
championships in a decade. In the most decentralized country, soccer championships
would be shared by 10 di¤erent cities in a 10-year period. In the most centralized
country, on the other hand, only one city would possess all the championships (e.g.,
Istanbul, Turkey, in 1990-99). This predicts for a country 42 di¤erent combinations
of championship distributions across the cities in a decade (i.e., 10, (9, 1), (8, 2), (8,
1, 1), etc.). Note that a country with three champion-cities in a decade, where the
championship distribution, say, is (6, 3, 1), is more decentralized than a country with
two champion-cities, where the distribution, say, is (6, 4) (i.e., vertical decentralization).
Likewise, a country with three champion-cities and with a championship distribution
27FIFA Survey: approximately 250 million footballers worldwide,FIFA o¢ cial website, 5 June 2006
28See Frick and Prinz (2004).
29The Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation.
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of, say, (6, 2, 2) is more decentralized than the one with (6, 3, 1) (i.e., horizontal
decentralization). In our context, the former is preferable to the latter, because, say,
competition among lobbies would lead to less distortions if political power is dispersed
spatially in a balanced manner.30
Given this, the next step is to summarize the data with a statistic. An appropriate
statistic is a concentration (or inverse fractionalization) index of the Herndahl type:
H =
nX
i=1
s2i
where i = 1; 2; ..., n is the number of di¤erent cities that have champions, and si is
the share of city is championships over the period 1960-1999. This index, labelled
SOCCER, would be 0.1 for the least centralized country, and 1 for the most centralized
country.
Sample selection is an important issue in using the soccer championship data. From
the set of countries for which data are available on www.rsssf.com, we exclude depend-
ent territories (e.g., British Virgin Islands, Martinique) and geographically very small
countries (e.g., Andorra, Luxembourg). Most of these do not provide regular data. We
also do not use city states (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong) and transition economies. The
notion of urban concentration and our theoretical channels may not be applicable to
these countries. We also do not use the US (where there are competing leagues) and
the English, Scottish and Welsh leagues, whose other economic data are available in a
combined manner as the UK. After this cleaningwe are left with the championship
data of 103 countries (listed in Table A1). Detailed information on the construction of
the SOCCER variable is available in the Appendix.
Another important issue is that even if a regular rst division league is played in a
country, soccer may not be a widely popular sport that attracts substantial economic
resources. For instance, in some British Commonwealth countries, cricket and rugby
are equally or more popular than soccer. To check for this e¤ect, in another sample we
utilize countries which participated in FIFA World Cup Finals between 1962-1998. We
assume that the strength of the soccer industry in a country would translate into the
participation of the country in the World Cup Finals. It appears that 45 of 103 countries
participated in FIFA World Cup Finals at least once during this period (see Table A2).
We nd that the results with this FIFA sample are generally consistent with the results
30The possibility of countries having di¤erent number of teams due to country size or richness is
controlled in the estimation.
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of the all 103 countriessample, meaning that the use of soccer championship data for
a global analysis is justiable.
Figure 1 depicts a snapshot of the level of income-geographical decentralization re-
lationship for a cross-section of 100 countries (this gure also shows conveniently the
distribution of SOCCER values).31 It is evident that the relationship is negative. The
downward slope of the simple regression line tted is statistically signicant. Figure 2
shows the relationship for the growth rate of real GDP per capita. The slope is similarly
negative and signicant. In fact, the gradient implies that the most centralized and
the most decentralized countries have 1.3% di¤erence in their annual average growth
rates over the period 1960-1999. Note that these graphs portray only the unconditional
relationship between the decentralization and development and as such should be taken
with care, due to several econometric concerns (see below). Nevertheless, the negative
unconditional relationships are telling.
4.2 Estimation
We estimate equations of the following type:
Yi = X
0
i+ "i
where i denotes countries, Y is the average log per capita income over the 2000-2004
period, Xi = f1; SOCCER;Zg ; where 1 is a vector of ones and denotes the constant
term, SOCCER is the proxy for geographical decentralization of wealth as observed
over the 1960-99 period, Z is a vector of control variables, and " is a random error term.
Following the institutions-economic development literature, we use log per capita income
as our benchmark development indicator.32
31Sample size in bi-variate relationships depends on the availability of other data. In our case,
although Iraq, Libya and Somalia have the championship data, they drop out from the estimations
because consistent national accounts data are not available for them.
32Using average log per capita income of the 2000-04 period, that of the 2000-07 period, or those
of individual years within this period provides very similar results. Where appropriate we use the
1960-99 averages for some of the time-varying controls, and 1960 values for others. Time lags between
the dependent and independent variables aim at mitigating the endogeneity problem, although we also
instrument SOCCER explicitly below.
19
4.2.1 Control variables
A measure on urban concentration, like SOCCER, is at the nexus of forces which may
be both positively and negatively associated with growth and development. Indeed, the
literature on the determinants of urban concentration argues that both economic and
political forces inuence the level of concentration.33 Economic forces behind the concen-
tration process are perceived to be rather natural factors, because agents are thought
to maximize their welfare and minimize their costs. The deviations from economic-
ally optimum levels of concentration are generally ascribed to political forces, especially
rent-seeking by economic agents. The latter generally works through favoritism, political
instability and restrictions on freedom.34 ;35 This suggests that, in our particular case,
controlling for the economic determinants of urban concentration on the right-hand side
in a (reduced form) regression can help identify the political impact of geographical
concentration, i.e., SOCCER, on development, which our theory predicts.36 Therefore,
the following variables have been used to control the economic determinants of urban
concentration: openness (Ades and Glaeser 1995, Davis and Henderson 2003), country
size (as shown by total population, Ades and Glaeser 1995, Davis and Henderson 2003,
Henderson 2003, Moomaw and Alwosabi 2004), and the share of government expenditure
in total expenditure (Wheaton and Shishido 1981, Ades and Glaeser 1995). Krugman
(1991) sees a negative link between openness and primacy, while dependency theorists
see a positive link. Ades and Glaeser (1995) nd empirical support for Krugman. Gov-
ernment consumption might reect a number of factors like higher transportation and
telecommunications expenditure, hence reduced concentration, but it may also reect
the degree of rent-seeking by di¤erent groups and, thus, political structure. Both Ades
and Glaeser andWheaton and Shishido nd that higher government involvement reduces
concentration. Finally, a larger country size implies greater potential market, which can
a¤ord greater number of cities, hence lower concentration. Studies generally nd a neg-
ative e¤ect, but its signicance varies. We use the 1960-99 averages of these variables in
33Recall the inverted-U shape relationship between primacy and development level.
34See Ades and Glaeser (1995) for a list of arguments.
35Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Davis and Henderson (2003) nd that political determinants of primacy
are stronger than economic determinants. In addition, in a robustness analysis, Ades and Glaeser (1995)
regress growth on urban primacy (i.e., population primacy) by holding certain economic variables
constant, and nd that primacy has negative inuence on growth.
36A perfect identication of political factors within SOCCER via controlling for its economic de-
terminants is, of course, impossible. The data may contain several observable and unobservable other
channels regarding the impact of geographical concentration on growth.
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the regressions because SOCCER is observed over this period.
Further to these variables, Z comprise a wider set of covariates, mainly following
Alesina et al. (2000). The list includes ethnic fractionalization, postwar independence,
oil exporting countries, number of guerilla wars, distance from equator, the shares of
population a¢ liated to Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu and Confucian religions,
and regional dummies (see also Ades and Glaeser 1995, and Davis and Henderson 2003,
who check the relevance of regional dummies to primacy). An important problem with
most of these variables is that they are related to political forces in the countries, such as
colonial background (postwar independence, hence colonization as argued by Acemoglu
et al. 2008), conict and civil instability (ethnic fractionalization, guerilla warfare), and
rent-seeking (oil, government consumption). Thus they may strip the explanatory power
of SOCCER in the regressions. In these cases, the sign and signicance of SOCCER
should be interpreted with care.
4.2.2 Estimation methodology
As noted above, a number of studies have established an inverted-U shape relationship
between primacy and development. Thus, despite the time lags between dependent
variables and SOCCER, an IVmethod would be appropriate to address a possible reverse
causation (which is a concern because SOCCER and development are likely to be time-
persistent). However, we also use OLS as a reference point for benchmark 2SLS results.
4.2.3 Instruments
We instrument SOCCER with binary indicators of capital city primacy and federaliz-
ation, as well as a group of variables suggested by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(henceforth AJR) (2001, 2002), which are log settler mortality, and urbanization and
log population density in 1500s, and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (hence-
forth AJRY) (2008), which are constraint on the executive at independence, and the
independence year.
 Primate Capital City: This variable takes 1 if the capital city is also the primate
city in the country, otherwise 0. It is expected that rent-seeking like lobbying and
favoritism is more likely to happen in the capital city. Henderson (2003) argues
that various forms of favoritism disproportionately draw migrants into the national
capital, resulting in over-concentration. Davis and Henderson (2003) argue that fa-
voritism can take the form of national government ignoring interregional transport
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and telecommunications, restrictions in capital markets, export/import markets,
and licensing of production rights, all favoring rms in national capital. Central
bureaucrats and politicians, with the ability to extract rents in the allocation of
loans and licenses, can attract local public services to the national capital. This
variable is a valid and strong IV as indicated by rst-stage regressions, and there
are strong reasons to believe that it is exogenous, and excludable from the income
equation. The choice of capital city should not be a¤ected by countrys devel-
opment level, and capital city primacy should a¤ect development only through
SOCCER and its associated political and economic e¤ects. Figure 3 shows the
predicted positive relationship.
 Federalization: It is also expected that power in federal countries is geographically
dispersed (Mutlu 1989, Ades and Glaeser 1995, Davis and Henderson 2003). In
fact, Figure 4 shows that federalization and SOCCER are negatively related. This
IV is also valid and strong as found in rst-stage regressions, and should be exo-
genous to development. One question that may arise here is whether federalization
can a¤ect development directly. We argue that this is not the case for two reas-
ons. On the theoretical side, federalization is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient
condition for development. There are various countries in the world which are
developed but do not have a federal structure, and others which do have a formal
federal structure but are not developed. On the statistical side, the second stage
models generally satisfy overidentifying restrictions, which means that the exogen-
eity condition is met for instruments (i.e., E(Jit; "it) = 0, where J is a vector of all
instruments). That is, instruments over and above which extrainstruments are
tested (i.e., those in J  S where S is the base IV) are exogenous (see Wooldridge
2002, p. 123). Having a strong theoretical basis for the exogeneity of the primate
capital city indicator above, federalization should therefore not be correlated with
the right-hand side, and is thus excludable.
 AJR and AJRY instruments: It is plausible to argue that SOCCER is an indicator
of institutional quality within a country. That is, countries with well-established
pro-growth institutions should tend, on average, to have more dispersed champi-
onships, and those with weaker institutions would allow political power to agglom-
erate. To nd exogenous variation for institutions, we turn to AJR (2001, 2002)
and AJRY (2008) who, in a series of well-established contributions, show that in-
stitutional quality within countries can be explained with variables that represent
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the conditions that colonial powers were faced when they landed in former colonies
(i.e., log settler mortality, and urbanization and log population density in 1500s)
and with those that represent early political institutions (i.e., constraint on the
executive at independence and independence year). While the AJR instruments
are valid for former colonies, the AJRY variables cover also non-colonies, and hence
allow for testing the implications for a broader range of countries. Following AJR
and AJRY, we argue that these IVs are exogenous to development and excludable
from the main equation. Their strength and joint usabililty is discussed in Section
5.2 below. Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 show that all of these variables have predicted
unconditional relationships with SOCCER. This instrumentation strategy enables
us to capture both contemporary and historical factors behind the agglomeration
of political power.
5 Empirical results
Data denitions and sources are provided in the appendix. Table 1 presents the summary
statistics of key data.
5.1 OLS Results
Table 2 presents simple regression results between log per capita income and SOCCER
using di¤erent samples. The full sample covers 100 countries, the colony sample covers
71 countries, and the samples of countries that participated in FIFA World Cups at
least once, twice or three times over the period 1962-1998 cover 44, 30 and 19 countries,
respectively. In all cases, SOCCER is negatively and signicantly related to the level
of development. In the full sample case, SOCCER explains around a quarter of the
variation in log per capita income. That FIFA samples reasonably replicate the full
sample assures us that the use of SOCCER in a global analysis is reliable.
Table 3 includes the results with control variables using the full sample, colony sample
and the sample of countries that participated in FIFA World Cups at least once (note
the degrees of freedom problem with other FIFA samples). Across all specications,
SOCCER is negative, but its signicance depends on the controls used. As expected,
too many controls wash out the explanatory power of SOCCER. This is particularly
evident in the full and colony samples, while more controls help identify the negative
and signicant e¤ect in the FIFA sample. Focusing on the full sample for the purposes
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of discussion, SOCCER is negative and signicant at 1% when the economic determin-
ants of urban concentration are controlled (Model 1). SOCCER is also robust to the
inclusion of ethnic fractionalization, postwar independence, guerilla war, oil production
and distance from equator as controls (Model 2). The coe¢ cient, however, is more than
halved. The major contributor to the decline in the coe¢ cient is the distance from
equator variable, with ethnic fractionalization and postwar independence having some
power as well (unreported). Model 3 includes religion and regional dummies (Western
Europe is the base region), and SOCCER is signicant at 20% level. Our further explor-
ation (unreported) shows that this change is not driven by a single region or religion, and
it is the joint presence of all controls that weakens the explanator power of SOCCER.37
OLS results may be biased and inconsistent due to reverse causation, so the discussion
here should be taken as suggestive.
5.2 2SLS Results - First Stage
Table 4a reports the rst step results for the full sample and the FIFA sample and Table
4b for the colony sample. The results are very interesting and insightful. First, countries
with primate capital cities are associated with higher SOCCER values, indicating greater
concentration. Depending on the sample and model specication, countries with primate
capitals have, on average, 0.10 to 0.30 points higher SOCCER scores than those whose
capital is not the primate city. On the other hand, federal countries are associated
with lower SOCCER values. Federal countries have, on average, 0.11 to 0.33 points
lower SOCCER scores than non-federal countries. For both variables, colony sample
nds higher coe¢ cients and FIFA sample lower coe¢ cients, with the full sample lying
in between the two.
Regarding the AJR and AJRY variables, as the Figures in the appendix hint, we
obtain the expected signs. In the full sample, the country with the highest constraint
on the executive score is associated with 0.13-0.21 points lower SOCCER value than
the one that has the lowest score, and every 100 years of delayed independence would
increase SOCCER by 0.07 to 0.12 points. Utilizing these variables jointly with primate
capital city and federalization (Model 7, Table 4a), primate capital, federalization and
independence year are signicant, while constraint on the executive is marginally signi-
cant, all retaining their signs. Note that this model captures two important sources of
37Within the sample that covers only former colonies, it is the joint presence of distance from equator
and postwar independence that weakens the explanatory power of SOCCER. This may imply that the
Sub-Saharan African regional e¤ect may dominate the SOCCERs e¤ect, relative other colonies.
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variation in SOCCER: one that is due to contemporary e¤ects, the other due to historical
e¤ects.
In the FIFA sample, only the constraint on the executive is signicant, and the
independence year is not. Making use of all four variables above delivers predicted signs
more often than not, but the explanatory power of the model appears to be modest.
This is probably due to small sample size, but there may not also be direct relevance of
institutional quality to the strength of the soccer industry.
In the colony sample, constraint on the executive and independence year possess
the predicted signs and their statistical signicance replicates the full sample case. We
additionally use log population density in 1500s. The variable has the expected positive
sign in isolation (Model 4, Table 4b), with t-statistic around 1. On the other hand,
controlling for primate capital and federalization washes out its explanatory power (see
Model 9). We also use log settler mortality. The coe¢ cient 0.088 in Model 13, signicant
at 1%, implies that the country with the highest settler mortality is associated with 0.61
points higher SOCCER score compared to the one with the lowest.38
Using all these variables as IVs in the second stage is, however, a di¤erent matter.
Despite predicted relationships with generally reliable coe¢ cients, the magnitude of the
F-statistics in the rst stage suggest that not every IV is strong, and that there are a few
di¤erent combinations of strong instruments that can be used in the second stage. First,
primate capital city and federalization provide combinations with high F-statistics (a la
Stock and Yogo 2005) in the full and colony samples, hence constitute a solid IV group
(Model 3 in Table 4a and 4b). Second, Model 7 in Table 4a, capturing additionally
the historical e¤ects by including constraint on the executive and independence year,
o¤ers another reliable group. Third, Model 15 in Table 4b suggests that primate capital,
federalization and log settler mortality o¤er a strong IV combination in the context of
former colonies, with a high and signicant F-statistic.
Finally, the FIFA sample generally delivers low F-statistics. However, the whole
purpose of using the FIFA sample is to show that SOCCER can be meaningfully used in
a global analysis; with predicted relationships found in the presence of several controls,
the FIFA sample has served this purpose very well. We proceed with the full and colony
samples next.
38This is a sample of former colonies for which log settler mortality data are available.
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5.3 2SLS Results - Second Stage
From the outset, our empirical results show that SOCCER is robustly signicant in
determining log per capita income. Table 5 presents the second stage results with the
full sample, utilizing two di¤erent IV groups. The 2SLS coe¢ cients are noticeably higher
than the OLS coe¢ cients, suggesting that the IV method is appropriate. In addition,
all specications with suitable controls successfully pass the overidentifying restrictions
tests. SOCCERs sign and signicance are robust to the use of controls, although the
coe¢ cient magnitudes change across specications, revealing important implications.
Models 1 through 4 in Table 5a use primate capital and federalization as IVs. In the
basic model, the coe¢ cient is -5.1, signicant at 1% level. When determinants of urban
concentration - government consumption, openness and log population - are added in
Model 2, the coe¢ cient increases by around 20%, again signicant at 1%. Importantly,
this implies that once SOCCER is freedfrom potentially useful (economic) e¤ects, its
political e¤ects appear to be more deleterious for development. Model 3 adds further
controls, most of which are of political nature, and as expected SOCCERs coe¢ cient is
reduced by around 25%. It is still signicant at 1%, however. Finally, SOCCER is robust
to the inclusion of religion and regional variables in Model 4. At this stage, compare
these results with Table 3 (Models 1 to 3) where the same models are estimated with
OLS. Notice that SOCCER is much more precisely estimated in the IV models even in
the presence of controls.
Models 5 through 8 make use of constraint on the executive and independence year
in addition to primate capital and federalization as IVs. The statistical precision of the
SOCCERs estimates are similar as before. Models with controls are more reliable given
overidentication test results. Note that SOCCERs coe¢ cients in Model 6 to 7 are
lower than those in Model 2 to 3. This points to the impact of further history in the IV
method. Controlling for religion and regional e¤ects leaves SOCCER signicant at 5%.
Table 5b presents the results using the colony sample. Again, SOCCER is stat-
istically very signicant in determining log per capita income. The rst IV group is
primate capital and federalization (Model 1 through 4). SOCCERs coe¢ cients in Mod-
els 1 through 3 generally mimick those in Table 5a. The di¤erence is that SOCCERs
coe¢ cient in Model 4 is nearly half of that in Table 5a (still signicant at 5% level).
This implies that religion and and specically regional controls have more signicant
impact on the SOCCERs e¤ect on development in this set of countries. Finally, Models
5 through 8 use log settler mortality in addition to primate capital and federalization.
The results are still robust and similar to the previous set of ndings.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
6.1 Growth approach
We also estimate growth models as a complementary analysis. The practical advantage of
growth regressions is that they provide coe¢ cients that can be meaningfully interpreted.
Thus we run the following regression:
Git = Y
0
it+ it
where G is the average of the annual growth rates of real GDP per capita over the period
1960-99, Yit = f1;SOCCER;Wg where W is a vector of controls, and  is a random
error term.
Growth literature has employed an array of variables as controls. Sala-i-Martin et
al (2004), in an encompassing and systematic analysis, nd 18 variables to be robustly
partially correlated with growth in a cross-sectional set-up.39 So, besides government
expenditure, openness and log population, we use all those variables, named BACE con-
trols, on the right-hand side. Of course, several of these variables are potentially highly
correlated with SOCCER. Insignicant variables in these regressions can be legitimately
removed through General-to-Specic (GTS) modeling procedure as far as Wald tests
allow (a la Hendry 1995). It turns out that elimination of insignicant controls (the
procedure generally follows similar reduction paths) leaves SOCCER with a negative
and generally signicant sign in the regressions.
Table 6a presents the results for the full sample. Using primate capital city and
federalization as IVs, only Model 4 nds a signicant e¤ect for SOCCER, at 10% level.
Utilizing two more IVs, however, namely constraint on the executive and independence
year, improves the signicance levels. Focusing on Model 8, the coe¢ cient -2.021, sig-
nicant at 5%, suggests an average of around 2% di¤erence in the annual growth rates
of countries with the highest and lowest SOCCER scores - e.g., Paraguay and Germany
in our sample - over the period 1960-1999 due to di¤erences in the geographical concen-
tration of wealth and its associated e¤ects. This is a signicant e¤ect that should not
be overlooked.
39These variables are East Asian dummy, primary schooling in 1960, investment price, log GDP in
1960, fraction of tropical area, population density in coastal areas in 1960s, malaria prevalence in 1960s,
life expectancy in 1960, fraction of confucian population, African dummy, Latin American dummy,
fraction of GDP in mining, Spanish colony, years open, fraction of Muslim population, fraction of
Buddhist population, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and government consumption share in 1960s.
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Table 6b repeats the same exercise with the colony sample, using the two sets of IVs
as utilized in Table 5b. Again the results are generally robust and informative. A few
consistent ndings are noteworthy. First, SOCCERs coe¢ cients follow the same pattern
the full sample case. That is, SOCCER is statistically signicant in the basic model,
when determinants of urban concentration are controlled, and when GTS modelling is
applied. As expected, it is insignicant when all BACE controls are used. Finally, the
second set of IV group includes log settler mortality in addition to primate capital city
and federalization. The pattern of earlier results is mimicked here. Note, however, that
the coe¢ cient estimate of SOCCER -2.393 resembles to that in Model 8, Table 6a. It
appears that the around 2% di¤erence in the annual growth rates the most and least
centralized countries due to SOCCER is a consistent empirical magnitude.40
Overall, these results are encouraging because evidence found across samples which
include di¤erent and often changing compositions of countries is consistent.
6.2 Panel data set
It is possible to capture time-wise variation in the data by decomposing the 40-year
time period into 10-year intervals. This would help control time-invariant individual
(country)-specic e¤ects, where the error structure is of type "it = i + it, with i
denoting country-specic e¤ects. In the full sample, 100 countries provide 345 decennary
observations for the panel. However, the major di¢ culty with the panel analysis is the
availability of time-varying instrumental variables with desirable characteristics. We do
not venture into this and digress. A feasible option here - and the one that will keep us
connected with the above analysis -, though, is an OLS estimation with lagged SOCCER.
This can mitigate endogeneity but not solve.41 We must thus note that this analysis is
only suggestive and we do not emphasize these results and present. However, a couple
of interesting ndings are noteworthy here. First, pooled and Between-e¤ects ndings
mimick the cross-sectional results in Table 3. Second, controlling for xed e¤ects leads
to insignicant estimates for SOCCER across all models, implying that within-country
relationship between SOCCER and development is insignicant. This suggests that the
relationships in our models encompass stronger between-country variation than time-
40Using primate capital, federalization and log population density in 1500s as IVs (as allowed by
F-statistic in Table 4b) and log per capita income or growth rate as dependent variables provides
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
41The estimating equation becomes Yit = X
0
it 1+ "it; where t denotes time. SOCCER is observed
over 10-yearly periods.
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wise variation. With the caveat in mind regarding the estimation methodology, it is
possible to conclude here that the explanatory power of SOCCER lies in the cross-
country dimension of geographical decentralization.
6.3 Decennary cross-sections
It is, however, possible to analyze the relationship for each decade using the same IV
methodology above.42 Besides allowing us to see the decade-specic e¤ects between
decentralization and development, this also shows us how the cross-sectional relationship
changed over time. The results using primate capital city and federalization are reported
in Table 7.43 We nd that while the coe¢ cient of SOCCER is almost always of negative
sign, its signicance depends on the time period and the model specication. Specically,
its impact is generally negative and signicant in the 2000s, and insignicant in the 1970s.
In the 1980s and 1990s, it is insignicant only when religion and regional dummies are
used as controls, otherwise signicant. Thus, these imply that the negative association
between decentralization and development is the weakest in the 1970s and becomes
stronger over time.
6.4 Measurement of SOCCER
The quality of the SOCCER data is the highest when we know all of the champion-
cities over 40 years, because in this case championship shares of cities can be calculated
precisely for the Herndahl measure. If the number of champion-cities known is less than
40, then we calculate the Herndahl index based on the available number of champion-
cities. See the Appendix for more detail. One may argue that this would lead to the
overestimation of geographical concentration as compared to the highest quality case.
Whether this is true or not, however, is not so clear. If, for instance, geographical
distribution of wealth does not change over time within a country which very plausible
to argue the extent of overestimation would remain limited. Nevertheless, we examine
the issue in the following way. The mean number of years for which we have SOCCER
42The following four equations are estimated: Yi;2000 = X
0
i;1990+ "i;2000;
Yi;1990 = X
0
i;1980+ "i;1990; Yi;1980 = X
0
i;1970+ "i;1980; and Yi;1970 = X
0
i;1960+ "i;1970;where
time periods refer to the 10-yearly averages of data for the relevant decade.
43We carry out the same analysis with OLS, across full and colony samples, and by using the IV
combinations adopted in the above analysis. As expected, the IV coe¢ cients are noticeably higher than
the OLS coe¢ cients. Otherwise, results across di¤erent samples and IV combinations are qualitatitively
the same. These extra results are available upon request.
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information across countries is 30. In our sample, there are 25 countries for which all
40 years of information is available and 64 countries for which information is available
for more than 30 years. We replicate our cross-sectional estimations using these data
points. The results are reported in Table 8. Using di¤erent IV combinations based
on high F-statistics in the rst stage, we obtain the general pattern of results above.44
Thus, we conclude that the results are not driven by the measurement of SOCCER. This
may also point out to the overall tendency that geographical concentration of wealth is
persistent within countries over time.
6.5 Other robustness checks
We carry out a series of further robustness checks. The results are not reported here
but available upon request.
Regional Decomposition of the Sample. We decompose the whole sample into Latin
American and Caribbean, Western Europe and North America, Sub-saharan Africa,
Middle East and North Africa, and East Asia and Pacic country groups. Re-estimating
the models does not reveal any signicant results. Thus, the relationship between geo-
graphical decentralization of wealth and growth has no region-specic characteristics.
Initial urbanization. One may argue that SOCCER may be a measure of urbaniza-
tion. This may be true to the extent that urbanization is correlated with development,
and because SOCCER is also correlated with development, urbanization and SOCCER
can be related. However, our arguments are related the e¤ect of SOCCER on develop-
ment over and above that of urbanization, which are often related to political e¤ects.
Note that urbanization in 1960 explains only 20% of SOCCER in the full sample, 10%
in the colony sample. Also, controlling for urbanization in 1960 in regressions reduces
the explanatory power of SOCCER, but leaves it generally signicant at conventional
levels, esp. in the models with controls.
Urban Primacy. One can also argue that SOCCER may be an indicator of urban
primacy. Controlling for the latter in the regressions (and treating it exogenous vs
endogenous, and linear vs non-linear) leaves SOCCERs e¤ects intact.
Urbanization in 1500s. AJR (2002)s primary indicator for showing the reversal of
fortune is urbanization in 1500s - log population density in 1500s is used as a comple-
44We also look at this issue in the panel data set, where 84 countries provide 214 decennary country
points with all championships known in a decade and 45 decennary points with 9 championships known
(in the latter case, at most only one citys championship share is imprecise, which would not distort the
distribution of championships). The results are similar to the cross-sectional case.
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ment. Country coverage of the latter is much broader, however. Among the urbanization
measures that AJR utilize, the one compiled from Chandler (1987) makes a strong instru-
ment (jointly with federalization) with a rst-stage F-statistic higher than 10, covering
36 countries. Re-estimating the IV models above shows that SOCCER remains negative
and signicant in the basic model and when determinants of urban concentration are
controlled. It becomes insignicant when more controls are used. Noting the degrees of
freedom problem and nite sample issues with IV methods, we are condent that the
AJR (and AJRY) instruments provide a successful exogenous variation in SOCCER.
7 Short Case Studies
In this section we provide a few short case studies to illustrate the general mechanisms
outlined above with some concrete examples.
Up until quite recently, most developing countries followed a path surprisingly similar
to the one Bates (1981) described for the case of tropical Africa. There and elsewhere,
governments typically tried to encourage industrialization by transferring resources from
agriculture to infant industries protected from foreign competition. For most of Africa,
states used monopsonistic agencies to buy exportable agricultural products at prices
below those set in world markets. Government revenues were then used to transfer
resources to both the bureaucrats themselves and to manufacturing through lending
at low interest rates, subsidies for the purchases of intermediate products and capital
goods, maintenance of exchange rates favorable to industry, imposition of quotas and
tari¤s that move the terms of trade against agriculture, and a host of other measures too
numerous to cite, but well-known to development economists.45 One consequence was
that, as Bates (1981, p.120) puts it, "[f]ledgling industries locate in urban areas. Work-
ers and owners, while struggling with each other for their share of industrial prots,
possess a common interest in perpetuating policies that increase these prots. They
therefore demand policies that shelter and protect these industries. Lobbying by
these groups tended to be successful as the initial policies typically created ...a few
centrally located producerswith the result that the costs of communicating, negoti-
ating, and coordinating strategies are comparatively low,46 while (mostly agricultural)
rival interests, on the other hand, were too numerous and widely scattered(ibid. p.
45See Ndulu et al. (2008).
46The endogenous lobby formation model of Mitra (1999) predicts that industries that are more
geographically concentrated would be the ones that get organized in equilibrium.
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88) with the consequence that their costs of organizing were higher. "By maintaining a
sheltered industrial order, [African states] generate economic benets for elites, as well
as resources for winning the political backing of inuential groups in urban centers
(ibid. p.120).
That these urban centers are reections of political power is the main result of Ades
and Glaeser (1995), who nd strong empirical support for the thesis that political forces,
even more than economic factors, drive urban centralization. Davis and Henderson
(2003), using a signicantly larger panel data set, provide convincing evidence that
urban concentration is caused by policies and politics. Further, recalling that soccer
was, and remains, the most popular sport in the countries in question, the parallels
between the circuses in Rome and soccer in modern day urban agglomerations, should
be more than evocative.47 One unmistakable sign of the eminence of these urban centers,
created (in some cases ex nihilo) and nurtured through political means and sustained by
the political power they thus acquire, is the support they can a¤ord to winning soccer
teams. Given the dominance of a few urban centers in the political landscape of most
African countries, it is not surprising that the average SOCCER score for Sub-Saharan
Africa is the highest (0.69) of all regions considered, with quite a few countries scoring
close to the highest (most concentrated) score of 1.
African countries are, of course, by no means the exception. Many developing eco-
nomies in our data set display the dominance of an urban center over the rest of the
country. These centers are typically also the capital cities, which is prima facie evidence
of the political nature of their preeminence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule.
An important example for our purposes is Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, respons-
ible for 25% of the countrys GDP, and home to 13.4% of the countrys total population.
The capital city, Ankara, though the second largest city in Turkey, represents only 4.7%
of the total population.48 Turkeys SOCCER score is quite high, 0.7450, indicating
a high level of concentration and reecting primarily the dominance of Istanbul-based
soccer clubs. One would then perhaps be tempted to draw the conclusion that this
example shows that a countrys SOCCER score captures economic rather than political
power. However, this would not be a correct inference. As Sevket Pamuk (2009) puts it
[i]Industrialization in Turkey made considerable progress during the 1960s and 1970s.
It had a number of important shortcomings, however. It depended strongly on gov-
47The title Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giantsof Ades and Glaeser (1995) is not acci-
dental.
48Istanbuls share of urban population of Turkey is 20.4%, whereas that of Ankara is 7.2%. The
gures are for 2001.
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ernment support and it remained inward oriented. Exports of manufactures remained
very low through the 1970s. Geographically, this industry remained concentrated in the
Istanbul region, and more generally, in northwest corner of the country. The industrial
elites of that era remained strongly dependent on the government, seeking subsidies and
tari¤ protection. They were also opposed to economic integration with Europe for fear
that they would not be able to compete with the products of European industry.49
The industrialists were represented by their organization TUSIAD (The Association of
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), which, as Bugra (1998) shows, was concen-
trated heavily in the Istanbul region. This industrial elite, despite the fact that their
location did not coincide with the capital city, was successful in its e¤orts to maintain
policies virtually indistinguishable from their counterparts elsewhere in the developing
world.50 They constituted ...an elite group who, not only by virtue of the small number,
large size, and geographical concentration of their enterprises, but also thanks to their
socio-cultural background, are likely to have di¤erent means of communicating, cooper-
ating, and representing their interests than the ones provided by the association(Bugra,
1998, p.526). It is also instructive to observe that when the Turkish economy started
to open up following the deep economic and political crises of the early 1980s, this new
...export-oriented economy widened the industrial base further to the regional centers
of Anatolia. The rapid expansion of exports of manufactures played a key role in the
rise of these new industrial centers, which began to challenge the Istanbul-based indus-
trialists...With the rise of the Anatolian tigers, the economic base of the bourgeoisie has
been expanding socially and geographically. The AKP government of the recent years
has been supported by these emerging elites in the provinces (Pamuk, 2007, p.26).51
These emerging eliteshave their own rival business organization MUSIAD (The As-
sociation of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) the geographical location of
whose members, as shown by Bugra (1998), is widely dispersed across the country.
Finally, it is useful to have a brief look at urban concentration and SOCCER scores
in Latin America as the region is well-known for its urban giants and provides a
49Pamuk (2009) reects the consensus view. See also Onis (1999) and Keyder (2004) among others.
50It is worth remembering that Istanbul had been the capital of the Ottoman Empire for almost ve
centuries (1453-1923), and (as Constantinople) of Byzantium for eleven centuries (330-1453) before that.
See Inalcik (2000) for the various price and non-price mechanisms used by the Ottomans to transfer
goods, population, wealth, and income to their capital.
51The political struggle between the old elite and the new, rising powers is still far from complete
and is being played out daily among various power-holders including the executive, the judiciary, the
army, and the legislature.
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fertile ground on which to test our arguments. In general, the picture of the region
that emerges for the period 1939-1990 is similar to the cases we discussed above. As
Thorp (1994, p.154) notes [i]In the majority of countries...agriculture for the domestic
market continued to su¤er from the neglect which it had always endured and export
agriculture su¤ered from the discrimination implicit in the protectionist policies being
widely and incoherently followed...It remained the case that the agriculture sector was
being taxed by all policies that forced it to sell at below world prices...52 As for
individual countries, a good place to start is the four countries discussed in Nugent
and Robinson (2001): Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The main
point of Nugent and Robinson (2001) is the importance of political competition for
economic outcomes. They argue convincingly that elites in the former two countries
were primarily merchants rather than landowners, as in the latter two, and that there
was more political competition in the former as compared to the latter. This, as they
also recognize, showed up as competition among urban centers. Thus, for Costa Rica,
they point out that ...in the absence of a dominant city or town at independence,
there was considerable rivalry and conict among the four main population centers...
(Nugent and Robinson, 2001, p. 19). Furthermore, each town tried aggressively to
lure in-migrants by selling them title to land in small parcels at very low prices. This
competition did not end even when Carillo became dictator...As all scholars record,
this process of competition involved from the early days, an attempt to attract both
labor and political support by o¤ering property rights to land. (ibid p. 20).53 The
federal, anti-central government sentiment in Colombia, on the other hand, was so strong
throughout the nineteenth century that there was a series of civil wars fought, with
Granadine Confederation and the United States of Colombia falling by the wayside
until nally the formation of the Republic of Colombia in 1886. The erce political
competition is recognized as having contributed to, as Williamson (1992, p.344) puts
it, ...the pragmatism which characterized the countrys economic development, for no
single interest-group could hold power for too long without arriving at some rough
compromise with rivals. This competition is reected in both the unusual number of
52The observations of Thorp (1994) relate to the period 1939-1950. Ffrench-Davis et al. (1994,
p.193) point out that for the period 1950-1990 ...a common feature of the development policies of
most Latin American countries during this period was a bias against agriculture, particularly through
discriminatory exchange-rate policies and declining domestic terms of trade vis-a-vis manufacturing
industry.
53The SOCCER score of Costa Rica is 0.35, while the average for Latin America and the Caribbean
is 0.5.
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large cities in Colombia (Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena) despite the presence of
a large capital city like Bogotá and its low SOCCER score (0.298), well below the Latin
American and Caribbean average. That these urban centers were powers to reckon with
is well established in the literature. One telling incident is recounted in Thorp (1994,
pp.155-56): The Minister of Economy, Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, on introducing more
severe import restrictions in 1949, tells how he went himself to Medellín to reassure
producers that there was actually ample exchange available for their real needs and took
the opportunityto remind them of the virtues of purchasing local raw materials. This
last point has been recounted in some detail precisely because it is so exceptional.What
made the minister go to Medellín is perhaps best understood by the fact that Medellín,
like Monterrey, had an industrially based and cohesive elite that retained considerable
power of negotiation with central government or foreign capital. Unlike the Monterrey
elite, but like that of Guadalajara, the Medellín elite was relatively numerous, based on
medium-scale enterprise, and committed to projects of civic betterment. (De Oliveira
and Roberts, 1994, p.279) The result was that as Thorp (1994, p.146) notes, Colombia,
alone among the countries discussed here, implemented a rather moderate protectionist
policy and one which sought to avoid the discrimination against agriculture and exports
implicit in every other case. By the 1960s Colombia had become the fourth largest
industrial economy in Latin America. By contrast, land-owning elites in Guatemala and
El Salvador had succeeded by the end of the nineteenth century to implement measures
that severely curtailed the movement of labor, trapping workers in co¤ee plantations
(Nugent and Robinson 2001). Both of these countries have substantial primate cities
with San Salvador accounting for 64% of the urban population of El Salvador, while the
metropolitan Guatemala City is home to 77% of the urban population of Guatemala.
The SOCCER score of Guatemala is among the highest in the region, 0.798, while the
small size of El Salvador accounts for its relatively low SOCCER score of 0.364.
For our purposes, it is also important to have a brief look at the paths followed by
Argentina and Brazil in the twentieth century. Their histories are signicant for our
analysis because as Williamson (1992, p.344) points out in Argentina and Brazil the
corporate state...did not include the holders of the most substantial economic power,
namely the agrarian economic elites. These states were largely vehicles for the middle
classes and the trade unions, and failed to incorporate the elites who earned the foreign
exchange needed to nance industrialization. One outcome was that [s]tate interven-
tion in the economy brought forth new webs of interesesbusinessmen, industrialists,
professional associations, trade unionswhose welfare often depended on decisions taken
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by bureaucrats and politicians. The object of these interest-groups, therefore, was to
inuence public policy so as to extract the best deal for themselves in the distribution
of national income (ibid p. 347). Despite these similarities, there were substantial
di¤erences as well. At the beginning of the twentieth century Argentina had achieved
levels of income comparable to the US and leading European economies. By 2008, its
(at PPP) per-capita income level stood below that of Botswana and Gabon.54 Brazil,
whose per capita GDP was roughly one fth that of Argentina in 191355, consistently
grew faster and in 2008 ended up with a per-capita GDP only 40% lower. Given the
similarity of policies followed, and political and economic upheavals su¤ered, this is sur-
prising. Though there are potentially several factors that may help explain the di¤erent
outcomes, it is worth stressing here the political competition mechanisms highlighted in
this paper. Our measure of the mechanisms involved, the SOCCER index, is radically
di¤erent for the two countries; it takes the value of 0.75 in Argentina, indicating a very
high concentration, whereas it is only 0.25 in Brazil. Given the urban concentration
observed and the political and economic history of these countries, these scores are not
that hard to explain. Buenos Aires, the main beneciary of the distortionary policies,
is home to about 40% of the urban population of Argentina as well as the majority of
its industry. The second largest urban center, Córdoba, contains only 4% of the urban
population of the country. Historically, Córdoba, as a center for the cattle and cereal
interests, could have potentially been a rival to Buenos Aires. However, the movement
for a more decentralized state that it spearheaded lost the ght against Buenos Aires in
the second half of the nineteenth century.56 The only other potential rival Rosario (with
again only around 4% of urban population) saw its bid to become the federal capital
vetoed on three occasions by the executive. The situation in Brazil was quite di¤erent.
By 1960, for instance, the top two urban centers, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro had
roughly equal shares of the urban population, 14.7% and 15.2% respectively.57 Histor-
ically, during Empire, Rio de Janeiro had been home to the politically protected sugar
barons but later had lost out to the co¤ee eliteof São Paulo, who used their political
power to have the valorizationscheme implemented by the Brazilian government by
1906.58 In 1930, those who had to pay the bill for the scheme, industrialists and urban
54See World Economic Outlook Database-October 2009, International Monetary Fund.
55See Maddison (2001).
56It is interesting to note that the initial mutiny which led to the 1955 Revolución Libertadora and
the deposition of Perón took place in Córdoba.
57Note that even the combined weight of these two, 30%, fall short of that of Buenos Aires.
58For the uninitiated, this was the scheme that involved keeping world co¤ee prices high by stockpiling
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middle classes as well as the cattle-raisers of Rio Grande do Sul (capital city: Porto
Alegre) and Minas Gerais (capital city: Belo Horizonte),59 gained power in the form of
a wealthy cattle-rancher/dictator Gétulio Vargas. Though the rule of Vargas ended in
1954, as Williamson (1992, p.429) points out there [was] a remarkable continuity in
the course of Brazilian development from the Gétulio Vargas era to the military govern-
ments of the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the period, the state directed a programme
of industrialization nanced by foreign loans and investment. Unlike the Argentinian
case, however, there were a plurality of interests present that could press their cases
politically. These are represented by the number of urban centers that thrived during
this period60: in addition to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the list of urban centers, each
home to 2-3% of the urban population, include Porto Alegre (the Gaucho capitaland
home town of Vargas), Belo Horizonte, Recife (initially a sugar town, converted later on
to an industrial center through nancial incentives provided by the central government),
Curitiba (initially another cattle town), Fortaleza, and Salvador (another sugar town).61
8 Concluding Remarks
Starting from the observation that many developing economies are characterized by the
dominance of a super metropolis, we have argued that the coexistence of a high level
of urban concentration with a low level of economic development is not an accident,
the former being emblematic of the causes of the latter. Taking historical Rome as
the archetype of a city that centralizes political power to extract resources from the
rest of the country, we developed two models of rent-seeking and expropriation which
excess co¤ee and releasing it gradually in world markets. As high prices led to more and more
production and stockpiling, the state had to borrow money in international markets to nance the
scheme. This led to a depreciation of the currency and ination. See Bulmer-Thomas (2003).
59The ranchers of the latter region broke ranks with their co¤ee-producing brethren to join the former.
60Note that these cities are well represented in the list of those that produced champion clubs.
61An article in the May 28th 2009 issue of the Economist, reporting from Rosario, highlights the
di¤erences between Argentina and Brazil with regard to the basic issues we discuss here : ...agriculture
earns Argentina much of its sorely needed foreign currency, so for produce that is allowed to leave the
country Ms Kirchner has hiked export taxes as high as 35%. These policies will cause long-term damage
to output. Farmers are scrimping on fertilisers to replenish the soils they plunder; some are leaving the
land...Farmers are organising themselves politically, using Brazils powerful farming union as a model.
The voiceoption is not the only one used by farmers, they exitas well (The Economist, June 18th
2009): Even tiny Uruguay now exports more beef than its neighbour across the River Plate thanks
partly to big investments by Argentines who like its commitment to the rule of law.
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illustrate di¤erent mechanisms that relate political competition to economic outcomes.
The voice model shows that rent-seeking by di¤erent interest groups (localized in
di¤erent specialized cities/regions) would lead to low investment and growth when the
number of these groups is low. Increased political competition in the form of more
organized groups engaged in countervailing activity is then shown to lead to more secure
property rights and higher growth. The exitmodel allows political competition among
those with political power (to tax or expropriate from citizens) over a footloose tax base.
It showed that when this power is centralized, say, in relatively few urban nodes, tax
rates would be higher and growth rates lower. When political power is decentralized
across di¤erent self-interested rulers in diverse jurisdictions, the competition over the
mobile resources leads to lower tax/expropriation rates, and higher long-run growth
rate.
Next, we test these hypotheses using international data to construct an index of the
distribution of soccer championships across cities in a given economy. In this we are
motivated by two considerations. First, the data used in the existing literature to meas-
ure urban concentration, namely the share of the largest metropolitan area in the urban
population, does not necessarily provide a good metric of the distribution of resources or
of wealth among cities and, thus, need not correlate well with the political power they
wield in the national political arena. Second, the ndings of the economics of sports
literature suggest that, as the worlds most popular sport, soccer produces successful
teams largely in those urban centers that have relatively high economic potential and,
ipso facto, political inuence. Utilizing a cross-sectional data of 103 countries covering
the 1960-1999 period, an instrumental variables estimation followed by a number of sens-
itivity checks nds strong and robust empirical support for the hypothesis that a lower
degree of urban concentration is highly positively correlated with long-run development.
Our instrumentation strategy makes use of the arguments pro¤ered by Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) in
a series of well-established contributions and captures both contemporary and historical
e¤ects regarding the politics of geographical concentration. Regressions with growth
rate of real GDP per capita, the latter being an alternative to the benchmark develop-
ment measure log per capita income, suggest that countries with the highest and the
lowest concentration scores in our sample - Paraguay and Germany, respectively, are the
typical representatives - have around 2% di¤erence in their average annual growth rate
in real GDP per capita over the period 1960-1999 due to political agglomeration and its
associated e¤ects. This e¤ect is hard to overstate given the large di¤erences it generates
38
in long-run levels of income.
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Appendix
1. Construction of the SOCCER index
Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation (RSSSF) is an ambitious organization that
was originally formed in 1994 by three contributors. The foundation collects soccer
statistics from all over the world with the help of country representatives, who the
RSSSF Board must approve as members. The number of members as of September 2009
is 344. RSSSF denes their goal as ..collecting all kind of statistics, in particular league
tables from all over the world, on football, and making this information available to
those sharing our interest. Moreover, those statistics should be as reliable as possible....
Members are approved by the Board if they can ensure the correctness of their data.
Charter of RSSSF is available at http://www.rsssf.com/charter.html.
The web site of RSSSF provides data on several leagues around the globe. We look
at the historical domestic statistics on annual soccer championships in national adult
male leagues starting from 1960. Provided as data are the champion soccer clubs for
each year. Our rst task was to nd the cities which these clubs were based in. For
a relatively large number of clubs, the cities are somehow indicated on the web site of
RSSSF (e.g., Bayern Munchen is based in the city of Munich in Germany, or Raja is
shown to be based in Casablanca in Morocco). For those that are not indicated, we went
into a laborious task to nd the cities, using various sources.62 After nding the cities,
62The sources used are: Game Name: Championship Manager 4 (Produced by: EIDOS),
ATLAS: Encarte World Atlas 1998 Edition CD, http://www.rsssf.com/country.html#champ,
http://www.uefa.com, http://www.fa.com, http://www.google.com, http://www.megasoccer.com/,
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we cross-checked the city names from a world atlas, and other internet sources to see
that the cities indeed constitute a separate entity, i.e., not, for instance, a suburb of a
metropolitan area (for example, the Swedish team AIK is based in Solno, which is a part
of Metropolitan Stockholm. Thus this team is assumed to be located in Stockholm).
Such cases were generally rare, however. For a few cases, RSSSF indicates that the
information on championships is disputed, so we did not use those entries. For countries
that gained their independence after 1960 (e.g., Bangladesh in 1973, Zimbabwe in 1980),
we used the information after the independence. In total, we dealt with 944 clubs from
480 cities around the globe.
Quality of the data. Data quality is the highest when the champion clubs for a
country are known annually over 40 years. Because, in this case, the championship
shares of all relevant cities are known precisely when calculating the Herndahl values.
In other words, typical championship shares such as 0.025, 0.05, 0.075... are precise. For
25 countries, all 40 annual championships are known over the period 1960-99.
However, going strictly by these criteria would ignore the information on some coun-
try points for which we know, for instance, 39 championships. The leagues were not
played or abandoned or the title was not awarded in some years for a reason (e.g., due
to a bribery scandal in Belgium in 1983, due to civil war in Guineau-Bissau in 1998, and
some other reasons in Colombia in 1989 and in France in 1993, etc.). Also, in some coun-
tries national soccer leagues were started after 1960 (e.g. in Australia in 1977), or the
countries gained their independence after 1960. Moreover, for a few clubs (around 10),
we could not nd the corresponding cities despite intensive e¤orts. The mean number
of years for which SOCCER information is available across countries is 30. Herndahl
index values for such countries are calculated based on the championship shares of the
available champion-cities (i.e., if we know, for instance, 39 champions within 40 years, the
championship shares will be 0.02564 (=1/39), 0.05128 (=2/39), etc). One may expect
that such observations on SOCCER would overstate the geographical concentration of
wealth in the respective country as compared to the completeSOCCER observations.
To address this, we replicate the estimations using more precise SOCCER observations.
The results are explained in Section 6.4. In sum, the results are remarkably similar to
the case where we use all the observations together.
2. Other data sources and denitions
The denitions of most variables are already provided in the text and in Table 1.
http://www.copamundial.de, http://www.unam.mx, http://www.worldfootball.org,
http://www.soccerca¤e.com, http://www.indianfootball.com, http://www.aboutaball.co.uk.
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The data on log per capita income, growth, share of urban population in total pop-
ulation, total population, and shares of trade, government consumption in GDP are
obtained from World Banks World Development Indicators (2003, 2009), CD ROM
and online versions. The data on ethnic fractionalization are obtained from Alesina
et al. (2003). We obtained the dummy variables on oil producing and landlocked
countries and latitude from Social Indicators and Fixed Factors data set of Global De-
velopment Network. Guerilla war data have been obtained from BanksCross National
Time Series dataset. The data on urban primacy have been obtained from Vernon
Hendersons web site (www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/). Primate capital city
indicator has been constructed using the information on Hendersons web site. We
constructed the dummy variable on federalization from the web site of the Forum of
Federations (www.forumfed.org). CIA World Factbook has been used to construct the
post-war independence dummy. The data on the shares of people a¢ liated to Muslim,
Catholic, Protestant, Hindu and Confucian religions were obtained from La Porta et
al. (1999). Data on BACE variables have been obtained from Xavier Sala-i-Martins
web site (http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/home.html). Data on AJR and AJRY in-
struments have been provided by Daron Acemoglu.
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Table A1. Full Sample Countries 
 
World Bank 
Code Country 
WB 
Code Country 
WB  
Code Country 
WB 
Code Country 
DZA Algeria EGY Egypt LBR Liberia IRL Ireland 
AGO Angola SLV El Salvador LBY Libya RWA Rwanda 
ARG Argentina ETH Ethiopia MDG Madagascar SAU Saudi Arabia 
AUS Australia FIN Finland MWI Malawi SEN Senegal 
AUT Austria FRA France MYS Malaysia SLE Sierra Leone 
BGD Bangladesh GAB Gabon MLI Mali SOM Somalia 
BEL Belgium GMB Gambia, The MRT Mauritania ZAF South Africa 
BEN Benin DEU Germany MEX Mexico KOR South Korea 
BOL Bolivia GHA Ghana MAR Morocco ESP Spain 
BWA Botswana GRC Greece MOZ Mozambique LKA Sri Lanka 
BRA Brazil GTM Guatemala NAM Namibia SDN Sudan 
BFA Burkina Faso GIN Guinea NPL Nepal SWE Sweden 
BDI Burundi GNB Guinea-Bissau NLD Netherlands CHE Switzerland 
CMR Cameroon HND Honduras NZL New Zealand SYR Syria 
CAN Canada ISL Iceland NIC Nicaragua TZA Tanzania 
CAF Central Afr. Rep. IND India NER Niger THA Thailand 
TCD Chad IDN Indonesia NGA Nigeria TGO Togo 
CHL Chile IRQ Iraq NOR Norway TUN Tunisia 
COL Colombia IRN Iran OMN Oman TUR Turkey 
COG Congo, Rep. ISR Israel PAK Pakistan UGA Uganda 
ZAR Congo, DR. ITA Italy PAN Panama ARE UAE 
CRI Costa Rica CIV Cote d'Ivoire PNG P. New Guinea URY Uruguay 
CYP Cyprus JAM Jamaica PRY Paraguay VEN Venezuela 
DNK Denmark JPN Japan PER Peru ZMB Zambia 
DOM Dom. Rep. JOR Jordan PHL Philippines ZWE Zimbabwe 
ECU Ecuador KEN Kenya PRT Portugal   
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Table A2. FIFA World Cup Finals Participants, 1962-1998 
Country  Finals Qualified 
Algeria  ’82 ’86 
Argentina  ’62 ’66 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98 ’94 ’98  
Australia  ’74  
Austria  ’78 ’82 ’90 ’98 
Belgium  ’70 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98  
Bolivia  ’94 
Brazil  ’62 ’66 ’70 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86  ’90 ’94 ’98  
Cameroon  ’82 ’90 ’94 ’98  
Canada  ’86 
Chile  ’62 ’66 ’74 ’82 ’98 
Colombia  ’62 ’90 ’94 ’98 
Congo, DR. ’74 
Costa Rica  ’90  
Denmark  ’86 ’98  
Egypt  ’90 
El Salvador  ’70 ’82 
France  ’66 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’98  
West Germany  ’62 ’66 ’70 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90  
Greece  ’94 
Honduras  ’82 
Iran  ’78 ’98  
Iraq  ’86 
Ireland, Rep. ’90 ’94  
Israel  ’70 
Italy  ’62 ’66 ’70 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98  
Jamaica  ’98 
Japan  ’98  
Korea, Rep. ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98  
Mexico ’62 ’66  ’70 ’78 ’86 ’94 ’98  
Morocco ’70 ’86 ’94 ’98 
Netherlands  ’74 ’78 ’90 ’94 ’98  
N. Zealand ’82 
Nigeria  ’94 ’98  
Norway  ’94 ’98 
Paraguay  ’86 ’98  
Peru  ’70 ’78 ’82 
Portugal  ’66 ’86  
S. Arabia ’94 ’98  
S. Africa ’98  
Spain  ’62 ’66 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98  
Sweden  ’70 ’74 ’78 ’90 ’94  
Switzerland  ’62 ’66 ’94  
Tunisia  ’78 ’98  
UAE ’90 
Uruguay  ’62 ’66 ’70 ’74 ’86 ’90  
 
Note: Excludes the US, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Haiti, Kuwait and transition countries (and therefore, 
Germany in the 1990-99 period). 
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Figure 3. SOCCER and Primate Capital Cities
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Figure 4. SOCCER and Federal Countries
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Figure 5. SOCCER and Settler Mortality
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Figure 6. SOCCER and Log Population Density in 1500s
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Figure 7. SOCCER and Constraints on the Executive
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Figure 8. SOCCER and Independence Year
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N: Number of observations 
 
 
Table 2. Income Level Regressions - Different Samples - OLS - Cross-section 
 Dependent Variable. Log Per Capita Income (2000-2004) 
 Full Sample FIFA -1 FIFA -2 FIFA-3 Colony Sample
      
      
Soccer -3.106*** -1.524** -1.516* -1.474* -1.555*** 
 (-5.380) (-2.045) (-1.911) (-1.967) (-2.998) 
Constant 9.288*** 9.444*** 9.556*** 9.774*** 7.792*** 
 (24.75) (20.83) (17.77) (18.83) (2.32) 
      
No of obs. 100 44 30 19 71 
R-squared 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 
      
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FIFA-1: Countries that participated in 
FIFA World Cup Finals at least once during 1962-1998. FIFA-2: Countries that participated in FIFA World 
Cup Finals at least twice during 1962-1998. FIFA-3: Countries that participated in FIFA World Cup Finals 
at least three times during 1962-1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Max Min 
Std. 
Dev. N 
       
SOCCER 0.558 0.501 1.000 0.144 0.280 103 
Log PC Inc. (2000-04) 7.580 7.424 10.761 4.494 1.779 100 
Growth (1960-99) (%) 1.671 1.542 7.282 -3.506 1.844 100 
Trade/GDP (%) 57.591 52.579 120.099 15.024 25.279 102 
Govt Cons./GDP (%) 15.103 14.026 36.088 6.372 5.763 102 
Total Population (/1000) 24361 7656 668713 223 69294 103 
Primate Capital City 0.840 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.357 103 
Federalization 0.149 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.351 103 
Log Settler Mortality 4.862 4.868 7.986 1.058 1.246 67 
Log Pop. Density 1500s 0.700 0.432 4.610 -3.831 1.534 71 
Cons. On Exec. 0.372 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.364 102 
Indep. Year (/100) 19.006 19.455 19.750 18.000 0.693 102 
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Table 3. Income Level Regressions with Controls - OLS - Cross-section 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
 Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Income (2000-2004 average) 
 Full Sample Colony Sample  FIFA-1 Sample 
          
Soccer -2.807*** -1.094*** -0.458 -1.630*** -0.532 -0.158 -0.598 -1.363** -1.150* 
 (-5.045) (-2.892) (-1.265) (-2.882) (-1.270) (-0.382) (-0.660) (-2.169) (-1.734) 
Govt Cons. 0.067** -0.009 0.013 0.008 -0.0323 -0.0128 0.164*** 0.035 0.029 
 (2.082) (-0.419) (0.649) (0.240) (-1.328) (-0.496) (3.105) (0.926) (0.951) 
Openness 0.004 0.018*** 0.007 0.006 0.027*** 0.015** -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.483) (3.395) (1.299) (0.568) (3.750) (2.160) (-0.570) (-0.307) (-0.467) 
Log Total Pop. 0.059 0.046 -0.005 -0.052 0.066 0.051 -0.094 -0.181 -0.249 
 (0.384) (0.496) (-0.056) (-0.355) (0.508) (0.363) (-0.389) (-0.901) (-1.477) 
Eth. Frac.  -1.455*** -0.285  -0.660 0.051  -0.352 0.606 
  (-3.012) (-0.733)  (-1.320) (0.102)  (-0.578) (0.878) 
Postwar Indep.  -0.970*** -0.136  -1.336*** -0.677  -1.140*** -0.670 
  (-3.822) (-0.415)  (-5.348) (-1.559)  (-2.987) (-1.460) 
Guer. War  0.098 -0.243  0.012 -0.420  0.404 0.406 
  (0.279) (-0.771)  (0.0286) (-0.958)  (0.522) (0.552) 
Oil Prod.  0.382 0.864**  0.342 0.633  0.0834 0.667 
  (1.105) (2.353)  (0.862) (1.483)  (0.128) (1.155) 
Latitude  0.046*** 0.048***  0.051*** 0.059***  0.060*** 0.047*** 
  (5.373) (4.257)  (4.546) (4.285)  (4.610) (3.172) 
Muslim   -0.013***   -0.006   -0.017*** 
   (-3.495)   (-1.086)   (-3.334) 
Catholic   -0.006   -0.0003   -0.006 
   (-1.310)   (-0.045)   (-0.763) 
Hindu   -0.016**   0.005    
   (-2.087)   (0.599)    
Protestant   -0.010**   -0.001   -0.009 
   (-2.210)   (-0.0723)   (-1.172) 
Confucian   0.006   0.018*   0.014 
   (0.857)   (1.995)   (1.543) 
Latin Amer.   -0.626   -0.699   -0.854* 
   (-1.656)   (-1.658)   (-1.892) 
SS. Africa   -1.928***   -1.496***   -2.018*** 
   (-3.564)   (-4.017)   (-2.900) 
South Asia   -1.608***   -1.779***    
   (-2.956)   (-3.858)    
MENA   -0.932**   -1.407***   -0.298 
   (-2.102)   (-3.209)   (-0.415) 
E.As. & Pac.   -0.299       
   (-0.693)       
Constant 7.330*** 6.959*** 8.156*** 7.834*** 6.017*** 6.667*** 7.759*** 8.989*** 10.82*** 
 (3.933) (6.463) (6.330) (4.329) (3.938) (3.517) (2.912) (4.592) (5.532) 
          
No of obs. 100 100 100 71 71 71 44 44 44 
Adj. R-squared 0.26 0.76 0.84 0.08 0.63 0.71 0.21 0.70 0.81 
          
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4a. First Stage Regressions of SOCCER – OLS - FULL and FIFA-1 Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Dependent Variable: SOCCER 
 FULL SAMPLE FIFA-1 SAMPLE 
               
Primate City - Capital 0.209***  0.128**    0.117* 0.183***  0.161***    0.104* 
 (3.648)  (2.212)    (1.896) (3.296)  (2.998)    (1.799) 
Federal  -0.276*** -0.230***    -0.181***  -0.113* -0.063    -0.0540 
  (-5.547) (-4.209)    (-2.889)  (-1.687) (-0.964)    (-0.852) 
Constrain on the Exec.    -0.155**  -0.207*** -0.131    -0.210***  -0.188** -0.119 
    (-2.089)  (-2.766) (-1.643)    (-2.706)  (-2.544) (-1.499) 
Independence Year     0.073* 0.103** 0.073*     -0.077 -0.037 -0.0438 
     (1.861) (2.614) (1.801)     (-1.512) (-0.769) (-0.880) 
Constant 0.383*** 0.599*** 0.484*** 0.617*** -0.834 -1.316* -0.848 0.295*** 0.466*** 0.329*** 0.509*** 1.865* 1.196 1.227 
 (8.047) (19.98) (8.780) (15.80) (-1.114) (-1.775) (-1.109) (10.02) (10.21) (7.959) (9.602) (1.949) (1.315) (1.294) 
               
No of obs. 103 103 103 102 102 102 102 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.07 
F test 13.31*** 30.77*** 18.07*** 4.36** 3.46* 6.06*** 9.97*** 10.86*** 2.85* 5.14*** 7.32*** 2.29 3.56** 2.43* 
 
Table 4b. First Stage Regressions of SOCCER – OLS - COLONY Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Dependent Variable: SOCCER 
Primate Capital 0.246***  0.160**     0.179** 0.169** 0.165** 0.301*** 0.215***  0.208** 0.180** 
 (3.917)  (2.251)     (2.449) (2.352) (2.234) (5.800) (3.449)  (2.638) (2.617) 
Federal  -0.308*** -0.244***     -0.212** -0.254*** -0.200**  -0.221***  -0.190** -0.196** 
  (-4.750) (-3.156)     (-2.468) (-3.274) (-2.267)  (-2.773)  (-2.080) (-2.105) 
Log PD 1500    0.021    -0.017 -0.005     -0.0154  
    (1.032)    (-0.880) (-0.286)     (-0.714)  
Const. on Exec.     -0.133  -0.163* -0.074  -0.081    -0.0623  
     (-1.503)  (-1.869) (-0.820)  (-0.938)    (-0.520)  
Indep. Year      0.092* 0.106** 0.086*  0.070    0.0719  
      (1.898) (2.269) (1.716)  (1.436)    (1.113)  
Log Set. Mort.             0.079** 0.0119 0.034 
             (2.597) (0.255) (1.045) 
Constant 0.389*** 0.638*** 0.495*** 0.584*** 0.650*** -1.166 -1.374 -1.125 0.498*** -0.815 0.337*** 0.444*** 0.202 -0.954 0.301* 
 (7.397) (19.45) (7.316) (16.98) (13.74) (-1.259) (-1.535) (-1.169) (7.309) (-0.871) (9.350) (7.772) (1.407) (-0.850) (1.904) 
                
No of obs. 73 73 73 71 72 72 72 71 71 72 63 63 63 63 63 
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.22 
F test 15.35*** 22.56*** 14.42*** 1.06 2.26 3.60* 4.46** 6.79*** 10.34*** 7.03*** 33.64*** 16.19*** 6.74** 5.83*** 10.17*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models with F-statistics in rectangles constitute the first-stage models. 
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Table 5a. Income Levels 2SLS Regressions - FULL SAMPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Income (2000-2004 Average) 
         
Soccer -5.072*** -5.987*** -4.577*** -5.429** -6.930*** -8.651*** -3.375** -3.038** 
 (-2.779) (-2.828) (-2.672) (-2.113) (-4.469) (-4.731) (-2.423) (-2.171) 
Govt Cons.  0.047 -0.010 0.016  0.037 -0.008 0.0127 
  (1.595) (-0.439) (0.626)  (0.976) (-0.424) (0.716) 
Openness  -0.004 0.007 -0.006  -0.011 0.011 -0.0002 
  (-0.402) (0.839) (-0.630)  (-0.845) (1.606) (-0.033) 
Log Total Population  -0.189 -0.222 -0.509*  -0.402 -0.131 -0.270 
  (-0.840) (-1.254) (-1.699)  (-1.597) (-0.899) (-1.579) 
Eth. Frac.   -1.383** -0.867   -1.404*** -0.556 
   (-2.269) (-0.949)   (-2.686) (-0.975) 
Postwar Indep.   -0.741** -0.610   -0.817*** -0.386 
   (-2.120) (-1.128)   (-2.792) (-1.035) 
Guer. War   0.424 0.429   0.324 0.0766 
   (0.844) (0.627)   (0.754) (0.190) 
Oil Prod.   0.254 0.394   0.287 0.643 
   (0.565) (0.664)   (0.759) (1.536) 
Latitude   0.032*** 0.038**   0.037*** 0.045*** 
   (2.613) (2.351)   (3.723) (4.270) 
Muslim    -0.004    -0.008 
    (-0.331)    (-1.285) 
Catholic    -0.0003    -0.003 
    (-0.035)    (-0.507) 
Hindu    -0.006    -0.011 
    (-0.344)    (-1.007) 
Protestant    -0.018*    -0.015*** 
    (-1.948)    (-2.599) 
Conf.    0.026**    0.015* 
    (1.981)    (1.733) 
Latin Amer.    -0.629    -0.582* 
    (-1.250)    (-1.694) 
SS. Africa    -0.349    -1.048** 
    (-0.430)    (-2.057) 
South Asia    -0.120    -0.751 
    (-0.087)    (-0.938) 
MENA    -0.402    -0.613 
    (-0.593)    (-1.292) 
Constant 10.37*** 12.12*** 12.07*** 15.58*** 11.40*** 16.07*** 10.29*** 11.98*** 
 (9.936) (3.407) (4.411) (3.540) (12.92) (4.470) (4.739) (5.027) 
IV Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal, Cons Exec, Indep Year 
No of obs. 100 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.57 0.49 0.57 0.67 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.28 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5b. Income Levels 2SLS Regressions - COLONY SAMPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Income (2000-2004 Average) 
Soccer -4.228** -6.317*** -4.254** -2.849** -5.255*** -6.937*** -3.830*** -2.615** 
 (-2.221) (-2.729) (-2.547) (-2.167) (-3.042) (-3.444) (-2.862) (-2.357) 
Log Total Pop  -0.541* -0.370* -0.254  -0.601* -0.301 -0.191 
  (-1.730) (-1.674) (-1.363)  (-1.905) (-1.546) (-1.078) 
Govt Cons.  0.0246 -0.009 0.004  0.0508 0.0003 0.004 
  (0.577) (-0.308) (0.165)  (1.092) (0.009) (0.154) 
Openness  -0.0151 0.005 0.005  -0.0220 0.006 0.006 
  (-0.867) (0.398) (0.556)  (-1.310) (0.683) (0.654) 
Eth. Frac.   -1.238 -0.648   -0.933 -0.456 
   (-1.636) (-0.743)   (-1.227) (-0.525) 
Postwar Indep.   -0.684 -0.746   -0.777* -0.689 
   (-1.549) (-1.521)   (-1.807) (-1.389) 
Guer. War   0.376 -0.115   0.228 -0.195 
   (0.780) (-0.229)   (0.407) (-0.342) 
Oil Prod.   0.0561 0.363   -0.006 0.293 
   (0.109) (0.917)   (-0.011) (0.711) 
Latitude   0.039** 0.053***   0.040** 0.055*** 
   (2.349) (3.245)   (2.446) (3.250) 
Muslim    -0.003    -0.003 
    (-0.330)    (-0.334) 
Catholic    0.003    0.004 
    (0.363)    (0.433) 
Hindu    -0.0101    -0.010 
    (-1.266)    (-0.981) 
Protestant    -0.007    -0.003 
    (-0.732)    (-0.285) 
Conf.    0.021*    0.0220* 
    (1.687)    (1.853) 
Latin Amer.    -0.756*    -0.642 
    (-1.761)    (-1.362) 
SS. Africa    -0.723    -0.628 
    (-1.506)    (-1.315) 
MENA    -1.280*    -1.126* 
    (-1.838)    (-1.691) 
Constant 9.367*** 15.95*** 13.04*** 11.22*** 9.957*** 16.87*** 11.90*** 10.17*** 
 (7.952) (3.500) (4.034) (4.218) (9.263) (3.950) (4.593) (3.946) 
IVs Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal, Log Settler Mortality 
No of obs. 71 71 71 71 63 63 63 63 
Hansen's J (p) 0.80 0.34 0.33 0.46 0.09 0.07 0.30 0.57 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6a. Growth 2SLS Regressions - FULL SAMPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita (1960-1999 average) 
         
Soccer -0.840 0.130 -1.756 -3.151* -2.604** -2.495 -3.570 -2.021** 
 (-0.614) (0.063) (-0.490) (-1.955) (-2.444) (-1.583) (-1.466) (-2.000) 
Govt Cons.  0.0199 -0.0268   0.0135 -0.071  
  (0.395) (-0.313)   (0.320) (-1.002)  
Openness  0.022** 0.0043 0.014**  0.0163 -0.001  
  (2.097) (0.297) (2.071)  (1.425) (-0.126)  
Log Total Pop.  0.394 0.121   0.180 -0.101  
  (1.569) (0.260)   (0.828) (-0.310)  
Log PC Inc 1960   -1.135*** -0.809***   -1.292*** -0.775*** 
   (-2.596) (-3.045)   (-3.134) (-2.975) 
E.As. & Pac.   0.297    0.172  
   (0.676)    (0.400)  
Primary Sch. 1960   0.009    -0.010  
   (0.083)    (-0.086)  
Inv. Price 1960   -0.013*** -0.010***   -0.016*** -0.008** 
   (-2.940) (-2.665)   (-4.991) (-2.019) 
Tropical Area   -1.903*** -1.477***   -1.835*** -0.998*** 
   (-5.886) (-4.089)   (-4.560) (-3.030) 
Coastline Pop   0.400    0.238  
   (0.913)    (0.499)  
Malaria   1.008* 0.562   0.969  
   (1.910) (1.000)   (1.637)  
Life exp. 1960   0.111*** 0.0583*   0.125*** 0.065** 
   (2.852) (1.677)   (3.157) (2.265) 
Conf.   0.0131 0.0360***   -0.0183 0.126*** 
   (0.165) (6.826)   (-0.286) (2.906) 
SS. Afr.   0.276    0.213  
   (0.606)    (0.378)  
Latin Amer.   0.641    -0.0568  
   (0.421)    (-0.0551)  
GDP Mining   5.966** 3.864   5.951** 6.185** 
   (2.356) (1.249)   (2.050) (2.411) 
Spanish Colony   -0.481    -0.127  
   (-0.473)    (-0.173)  
Years Open   1.454**    1.063* 0.969* 
   (2.148)    (1.731) (1.892) 
Muslim   -0.0112 -0.00657   -0.0149**  
   (-1.343) (-1.057)   (-2.427)  
Buddhist   0.446    4.279 -9.710** 
   (0.0488)    (0.610) (-2.258) 
Eth. Fractionalization   -0.783 -1.881**   -1.005 -1.461** 
   (-1.069) (-2.239)   (-1.285) (-2.499) 
Constant 2.133*** -3.547 4.397 7.079** 3.127*** 0.301 9.330 5.844*** 
 (2.899) (-0.936) (0.426) (2.401) (5.557) (0.0966) (1.249) (3.378) 
IV Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal, Cons Exec, Indep Year 
No of obs. 100 100 62 76 99 99 62 76 
Wald test    0.17    0.42 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.41 0.13 0.10 0.58 0.22 0.17 0.42 0.92 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6b. Growth 2SLS Regressions - COLONY Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita (1960-1999 average)
Soccer -2.978*** -4.945** -2.247 -3.030*** -3.526*** -3.798*** 0.031 -2.393*** 
 (-2.709) (-2.320) (-0.936) (-2.662) (-3.967) (-2.732) (0.027) (-2.748) 
Govt Cons.  -0.044 -0.003   -0.0131 -0.015  
  (-0.966) (-0.018)   (-0.351) (-0.240)  
Openness  0.0161 -0.026 0.027**  0.0131 0.025* 0.016* 
  (1.078) (-0.919) (2.183)  (1.191) (1.823) (1.937) 
Log Total Pop.  -0.165 -0.073   0.0598 0.631***  
  (-0.504) (-0.153)   (0.243) (2.629)  
Log PC Inc 1960   -1.601*** -1.047***   -0.742** -0.574** 
   (-3.119) (-2.717)   (-2.496) (-2.177) 
E.As. & Pac.   1.450 0.731   1.169*** 1.286** 
   (1.454) (1.151)   (3.336) (2.094) 
Primary Sch. 1960   0.145    0.238  
   (0.561)    (1.364)  
Inv. Price 1960   -0.013*** -0.009**   -0.012*** -0.006 
   (-5.385) (-2.342)   (-4.808) (-1.361) 
Tropical Area   -1.914*** -1.884***   -1.444*** -1.816*** 
   (-3.807) (-2.940)   (-2.886) (-3.431) 
Coastline Pop   0.884    0.754*  
   (1.496)    (1.722)  
Malaria   1.019    1.258***  
   (1.581)    (2.634)  
Life exp. 1960   0.113*** 0.067*   0.056**  
   (2.763) (1.719)   (2.168)  
Conf.   -0.375 0.023*   0.040 0.044*** 
   (-1.630) (1.679)   (0.245) (6.197) 
SS. Africa   1.114    0.021  
   (1.218)    (0.037)  
Latin Amer.   2.001** 0.710   1.538* 1.110** 
   (1.977) (1.102)   (1.693) (1.992) 
GDP Mining   9.476***    1.906  
   (3.133)    (0.859)  
Spanish Colony   -0.265    -0.250  
   (-0.556)    (-0.560)  
Years Open   0.452    -0.075  
   (0.461)    (-0.107)  
Muslim   -0.00451    -0.007  
   (-0.558)    (-1.122)  
Buddhist   42.78*    -2.010  
   (1.750)    (-0.119)  
Eth. Fractional.   -0.270    0.469  
   (-0.275)    (0.752)  
Constant 3.022*** 5.402 8.589 6.900*** 3.225*** 2.339 -4.340 6.722*** 
 (5.100) (1.197) (0.897) (3.116) (6.874) (0.730) (-1.012) (3.598) 
IVs Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal, Log Settler Mortality 
No of obs. 71 71 42 56 63 63 37 52 
Wald test    0.54    0.10 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.65 0.71 0.61 0.96 0.21 0.26 0.49 0.70 
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Table 7. Income Level 2SLS Regressions - Decennary Cross-Sections – Full Sample 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lagged variables refer to the values of the prior decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
                 
 Dep. Var: Log Per Capita Income 2000-04 Dep. Var: Log Per Capita Income 1990-99 Dep. Var: Log Per Capita Income 1980-89 Dep. Var: Log Per Capita Income 1970-79 
                 
                 
Lagged SOCCER -5.009** -6.200** -4.578** -6.201 -5.477* -6.762* -4.663* -4.334 -6.036*** -6.499** -6.188* -10.26 -5.566 -6.651 -4.622 -1.890 
 (-2.156) (-2.296) (-2.201) (-1.604) (-1.950) (-1.740) (-1.705) (-1.098) (-2.627) (-2.439) (-1.889) (-1.155) (-1.477) (-0.905) (-0.833) (-0.207) 
Lagged Govt Cons.  0.069** 0.016 0.012  -0.031 -0.048 -0.032  -0.001 -0.015 -0.034  -0.021 -0.088 -0.065 
  (2.348) (0.751) (0.313)  (-0.553) (-1.620) (-0.871)  (-0.0271) (-0.573) (-0.681)  (-0.138) (-0.958) (-0.424) 
Lagged Trade/GDP  -0.008 0.001 -0.007  0.012 0.014** 0.008  0.011 0.010 0.008  -0.013 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.921) (0.067) (-0.897)  (1.218) (2.097) (1.155)  (0.928) (1.032) (0.489)  (-0.453) (-0.095) (-0.099) 
Lagged Log Tot. Pop.  -0.206 -0.232 -0.472*  -0.231 -0.193 -0.301  -0.0798 -0.238 -0.516  -0.121 -0.113 -0.039 
  (-1.084) (-1.558) (-1.756)  (-0.644) (-0.918) (-1.000)  (-0.338) (-1.098) (-0.943)  (-0.280) (-0.393) (-0.067) 
Ethnic Frac.   -1.275** -0.825   -1.113 -0.747   -1.418 -2.690   -1.145 -0.920 
   (-2.196) (-0.794)   (-1.607) (-0.725)   (-1.389) (-0.826)   (-1.003) (-0.448) 
Lagged Guer War.   0.486 0.839   -0.260 -0.395   0.654 2.045   0.315 -0.010 
   (0.877) (1.195)   (-0.675) (-1.220)   (1.131) (0.999)   (0.587) (-0.025) 
Postwar Indep.   -0.957*** -1.043   -0.753** -0.553   -0.376 -1.177   -0.983** -0.845 
   (-2.630) (-1.339)   (-2.034) (-1.216)   (-0.596) (-1.093)   (-2.038) (-0.448) 
Oil  Producing   0.0841 -0.210   0.287 0.657   0.180 0.310   1.771 1.688 
   (0.176) (-0.228)   (0.537) (1.258)   (0.283) (0.226)   (1.411) (0.739) 
Latitude   0.0331** 0.0275   0.0280* 0.037**   0.0101 -0.0233   0.0263 0.0466* 
   (2.562) (1.196)   (1.704) (2.126)   (0.378) (-0.330)   (0.918) (1.852) 
Muslim    -0.001    -0.011*    -0.00572    -0.023** 
    (-0.092)    (-1.852)    (-0.366)    (-2.054) 
Catholic    0.003    -0.006    -0.0260    -0.004 
    (0.300)    (-0.806)    (-1.113)    (-0.701) 
Protestant    -0.007    -0.0144    -0.0257    -0.0138 
    (-0.587)    (-1.277)    (-1.258)    (-0.324) 
Hindu    -0.013    -0.010    0.418     
    (-0.683)    (-0.508)    (1.111)     
Conf    0.0224    0.0146    -0.0111    -0.002 
    (1.230)    (1.426)    (-0.621)    (-0.113) 
Latin Am. and Carib.    -0.766    -0.402    -0.805    -0.686 
    (-1.122)    (-0.900)    (-0.619)    (-0.448) 
SS Africa    -0.196    -0.450    0.521    0.164 
    (-0.152)    (-0.374)    (0.252)    (0.0690) 
South Asia    0.257    -0.456    -4.150     
    (0.161)    (-0.399)    (-1.407)     
MENA    0.519    -0.537    -1.448    0.049 
    (0.507)    (-1.180)    (-1.021)    (0.067) 
Constant 10.62*** 12.77*** 12.53*** 16.36*** 10.71*** 13.39** 12.24*** 13.60** 11.31*** 11.80*** 13.58*** 22.14* 11.14*** 13.69 12.72 10.54 
 (7.329) (3.432) (4.287) (3.153) (6.298) (2.087) (3.007) (2.250) (7.752) (3.086) (3.206) (1.685) (4.749) (1.293) (1.596) (0.625) 
IVs Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal 
No of obs. 99 98 98 98 96 95 95 95 86 80 80 80 64 61 61 61 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.53 0.55 0.82 0.83 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.55 0.56 0.73 0.68 0.19 0.23 0.81 0.08 
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Table 8. Income Level 2SLS Regressions - Precise SOCCER Observations – Full Sample and Colony Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Income (2000-2004 Average) 
Soccer -2.666*** -2.743*** -3.869*** -2.744* -4.938** -6.295** -3.024 -4.083 -4.502** -6.446*** -3.025** -3.621 
 (-3.388) (-3.766) (-3.707) (-1.861) (-2.080) (-2.420) (-1.577) (-1.498) (-2.346) (-2.671) (-2.056) (-1.375) 
Govt Cons.    0.063  0.049 -0.035 -0.040  -0.005 -0.069 -0.060 
    (1.337)  (0.658) (-0.625) (-0.705)  (-0.036) (-0.86) (-0.502) 
Openness    -0.011  -0.008 0.010 -0.001  -0.047* -0.009 -0.007 
    (-0.812)  (-0.521) (1.264) (-0.080)  (-1.678) (-0.588) (-0.392) 
Log Total Pop.    -0.279*  -0.252 -0.06 -0.380  -1.023** -0.419* -0.384 
    (-1.760)  (-0.933) (-0.362) (-1.330)  (-2.035) (-1.679) (-1.152) 
Eth. Frac.       -1.377 -0.627   -0.205 -0.486 
       (-1.556) (-0.576)   (-0.181) (-0.264) 
Postwar Indep.       -0.870* -0.950   -1.124*** -1.084 
       (-1.899) (-1.023)   (-2.831) (-1.032) 
Guer. War       0.314 0.224   -0.477 -0.528 
       (0.499) (0.261)   (-0.696) (-0.646) 
Oil Prod.       0.480 0.552   0.862 0.816 
       (0.673) (0.808)   (1.514) (1.302) 
Latitude       0.042*** 0.055**   0.044** 0.062** 
       (2.789) (2.446)   (2.014) (2.479) 
Muslim        -0.0124    -0.009 
        (-1.393)    (-0.539) 
Catholic        -0.0064    0.004 
        (-0.668)    (0.146) 
Protestant        -0.024*    -0.0348 
        (-1.911)    (-0.695) 
Conf.        0.015     
        (1.154)     
Latin Amer.        -0.472    -0.641 
        (-0.819)    (-0.356) 
SS. Africa        -0.100    0.460 
        (-0.086)    (0.407) 
MENA        0.119    -0.186 
        (0.163)    (-0.177) 
Constant 10.44*** 9.331*** 11.00*** 12.61*** 10.43*** 13.12*** 9.777*** 14.20*** 9.475*** 22.27*** 13.85*** 13.91** 
 (23.92) (19.91) (25.13) (4.581) (8.658) (3.205) (3.471) (3.125) (8.603) (3.238) (3.992) (2.069) 
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
IV   Const. on the Exec. Primate Capital, Federal Primate Capital, Federal, Log Settler Mortality 
First stage F-stat.   18.90 18.90 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 9.88 9.88 9.88 9.88 
Known years 40 ≥30 40 40 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 ≥30 
No of obs. 25 64 25 25 64 64 64 64 41 41 41 41 
Adj. R-squared 0.27 0.14           
Hansen's J (p-val)   Exactly Identified 0.31 0.25 0.53 0.47 0.14 0.19 0.91 0.94 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
